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ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES OF COMMERCIAL PAPER
PART It
FREDERICK M. HARTtt AND WILLIAM F. WILLIERttt

The elements necessary to make an instrument negotiable are
totally a matter of form and are governed by the provisions of
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. An instrument meeting
the form requirements of the Code enjoys special treatment under
the law, and negotiable instruments make up a large part of the paper
used in business. This article will discuss the various requirements of
form which go to make up a negotiable instruments, leaving the
effects of negotiability for other places.
I
SECTIONS GOVERNING SCOPE OF ARTICLE 3

Three sections of Article 3 define the type of instruments that
come within the Article. Section 3-103 is exclusionary:
(1) This Article does not apply to money, documents of title, or
investment securities.

(2) The provisions of this Article are subject to the provisions of the
Article on Bank Deposits and Collections (Article 4) and Secured
Transactions (Article 9).

Subsection (1) illustrates a definite change in policy from the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (U.N.I.L.).' Soon after that
act gained adoption by a number of states it was held to include
stocks, bonds, and other instruments common to the securities
market.2 The Code has excluded such instruments from Article 3
tCopyright © 1970 by Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. All Rights Reserved. This article
will appear in a forthcoming book by the authors on Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Tom L. Popejoy, Jr. for his assistance in research and editing.
ttProfessor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
tttProfessor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1. "[I] t might have been expected that the new Commercial Code would recodify in one
article all the law of negotiability as it applies to all types of negotiable paper, with special
sections reserved for variation such as occur in investment papers, commodity papers and
the like. However, the draftsmen saw fit to adopt a contrary policy. Article 3 on Commercial Paper, instead of covering the entire field, reverts to the English scheme of drafting a
narrow act encompassing only checks, drafts, simple promissory notes and certificates of
deposit.... Thus, vast amounts of what were formerly negotiable paper within the scope of
the N.I.L. have been excluded from the new Article." Beutel, Comparisonof the Proposed
Commercial Code, Article 3, and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 Neb. L. Rev. 531, 536
(1951).
2. "When the N.I.L. was first enacted it was argued by eminent authors that the act, like
the B.E.A. [English Bill of Exchange Act], covered only checks, drafts and notes, leaving
other instruments to their normal common law development; but when the full intent of the
codifiers of the N.I.L. was understood, it became apparent that it covered the entire field of
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and provided a separate Article, Article 8, governing them. Even
where a security meets the formal requirements of Article 3 and is

within its scope, it is excluded from that Article.'
Documents of title are governed by Article 7 of the Code, and are
never within Article 34 As will be discussed, the cleavage between
Article 9 and Article 3 is not so clear.' There is no reason why one

instrument cannot serve as both a security interest and commercial
paper,' but where there is conflict between Article 9 and Article 3,
the former prevails. The rules of Article 4 basically govern interbank
relationships7 and the relationship between a bank and its customers.8 Generally, when Article 4 is operative commercial paper is
involved, but the Code has spelled out different rules in certain cases
just because the participants are banking institutions or because the
relationships between banks are different from those between nonbanks.9 Money is also excluded from Article 3,1 ' as it is from
Article 8.' 1
The second important section governing the scope of Article 3 is
negotiability. Although the courts for a time continued the application of common law to
the unusual or new types of instruments, as the full force of the N.I.L. was called to their
attention, they began to apply it unhestiatingly to the complete extent of its literal meaning." Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 205, 206 (1933).
3. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(b): "A writing which is a security is governed by this Article and
not by Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper even though it also meets the requirements of that Article .. "
In White v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 96 N.J. Super. 565, 218 A.2d 655
(1966), the court applied Article 3 to a transaction involving stock. To fill the gaps in
Article 8 and to aid in the construction of that Article, Article 3 was applied by analogy to
stock warrants attached to debentures in E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank,
259 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Mich. 1966), Annot. Wilier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest
§ 8-302, A2. Article 3 was also misapplied in Brazos River Authority v. Carr, 405 S.W.2d
689 (1966), a case involving revenue bonds and attached coupons.
in, Rago v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 89 Ill. App.2d 12, 232 N.E.2d 88 5 U.C.C. Rep. 172
(1967), Annot. Wlllier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-307, A22, a note and attendant
mortgage were held to be governed by Article 3 since the mortgage was not a "security"
within Article 8.
4. See U.C.C. § 7-104.
5. See § § IX[5], X[1] infra. See also, D'Andrea v. Feinber, 45 Misc.2d, 270, 256
N.Y.S.2d 504, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 410; (Sup. Ct. 1965), Annot. Willier & Hart, U.C.C. ReporterDigest § 3-105, A2.
6. Id.
7. U.C.C. § § 4-102, 4-201 et seq., 4-301 et seq.
8. U.C.C. § § 4-102, 4-401 et seq.
9. For an instructive case on the relationship between Articles 3 and 4, see Leaderbrand
v. Central State Bank of Wichita, 202 Kan. 450, 450 P.2d 1, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 172 (1969).
10. Federal Reserve Notes are "money" within the definition in U.C.C. § 1-201(24) and
thus are not within Article 3 of the Code. Commonwealth v. Saville, 353 Mass. 458, 233
N.E.2d 9, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 1062 (Mass. 1968), Annot. Wilier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest
§ 3-102, A3.
11. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(b).
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Section 3-104(1). This section provides the essential attributes of
commercial paper, thereby restricting the scope of the Article. It
provides:
(I) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article
must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in
money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given
by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
This section provides for two types of negotiable instruments:
drafts and notes. Section 3-104(2) defines these along with two particular types of instruments that form a small subgroup:
(2) A writing which complies with the requirements of this section
is
(a) a 'draft' ('bill of exchange') if it is an order;1 2
(b) a 'check' if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on
demand;
(c) a 'certificate of deposit' if it is an acknowledgment by a
bank of receipt of money with an engagement to repay it;
(d) a 'note' if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit.
Subsection (2) is largely descriptive and primarily useful in drafting
later sections of the Code.
The final section in Article 3 bearing on its scope is Section 3-805.
It provides:
This Article applies to any instrument whose terms do not preclude transfer and which is otherwise negotiable within this Article
but which is not payable to order or to bearer, except that there can
be no holder in due course of such an instrument.
Thus, Article 3 provides for a sort of quasi-negotiable instrument,
one that does not have the primary characteristic of commercial
12. Assuming postal domestic money orders are negotiable within the meaning of Article
3 of the Code, Section 5104 of Title 39 of the U.S.C.A., contrary to U.C.C. Sections 3-301
and3-206, prohibits more than one endorsement and therefore the instruments are nonnegotiable. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 263 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1967).
Bank money orders, however, have been held negotiable. Lupowitz v. New York Bank for
Savings, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 851 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Bronx County, 1968). McLaughlin v. Franklin
Society Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1183 (N.Y. Cir. Ct., N.Y. County, 1969).
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paper, but which is governed by the Article anyway. 3 Such instruments are not truly negotiable, because the prime attribute of
negotiable paper is the ability of a good faith purchaser, holder in
due course as he is called, to take greater rights than those of his
transferor.
Section 3-104 is the key to any investigation of the type of instruments covered by Article 3. This article is devoted to a discussion of
its provisions and of other Code provisions that affect it.
II
ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES OF COMMERCIAL PAPER IN GENERAL
A judge once said that to be negotiable, an instrument must be a
"courier without luggage." It is true that there is a definite advantage
if the takers of negotiable instruments do not have to be bothered
with cumbersome and uncertain terms. Their interest is expressed in
terms of the dollars and cents they can collect on the instrument and
when and from whom they can collect it. Thus, a negotiable instrument must be precise and clear in these respects, and that is the
essence of Section 3-104. This is not to say that the courier cannot
have an attache case containing a toothbrush, razor, and other items
harmless to the directness of his mission.
Section 3-104 sets out the basic attributes of commercial paper in
Subsection (1). Sections 3-105 through 3-115 contain specific rules
governing the various requirements established by Section 3-104. An
instrument usually has or does not have the essential attributes to be
negotiable at the time it is given life by the maker of a note or the
drawer of a draft-i.e., at the time of issuance by delivery to the first
holder. However, mere omissions may later be supplied properly by
the holder as "agent" for the issuer.' ' What follows in this section of
13. "[T] he Code proposes to give semi-negotiability to an instrument which otherwise
conforms with the Code, but does not contain words of negotiability.... Under the N.I.L.
such an instrument is nonnegotiable. At common law there was some recognition of this
kind of an instrument as within the Statute of Anne, a decision which Lord Kenyon
regretted. The Code's proposal perpetuates a regrettable incident and insures unpredictable
consequences." Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability- The Negotiable Instruments
Law Compared With the ProposedCommercial Code, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
See also, Comet Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Group, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 852
(N.Y. Civil Ct., N.Y. County, 1968).
For correct applications of § 3-805, see Northerlin Co., Inc. v. Ranch Constr. Corp., 4
U.C.C. Rep. 320 (N.Y. Super. Ct., N.Y. County, 1967), Compare Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d
815, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1091, (Alaska 1968), Annot. Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest
§ 3-805, A2; Nationwide Check Corp. v. Banks, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 43 (D.C. & App., 1969).
14. U.C.C. § 3-115. State v. Moreno, 240 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1968), 5 U.C.C. Rep. 385,
Annot. Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-104, A8. Century Appliance Co. v. Groff,
56 Lane, L.R. 67, 19 Somerset L.J. 51, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 226 (Lancaster County[Ct., Pa.
1958), Annot., Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-115, Al; Davis v. Commonwealth,
399 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966), 3 U.C.C. Rep. 363; Waterbury Savings Bank v.
Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cit. Ct. 620,4 U.C.C. Rep. 1049 (1967), Chester Valley Refrig. Co. v.
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the article is intended simply to outline the stage setting. The sections that follow add the flats, scrim, paint, lights, and furnishings.
A. Person Entitled to Payment
A negotiable instrument must be payable to the order of a
specified person, entity, or office, or to bearer.' s It is payable to
bearer if it so states or if it is payable to a "non-person," such as
cash.' 6 The reasons for this requirement are twofold:
(1) Assuming no transfer of the instrument, the maker of a
note and the drawee of a draft must know who is entitled to
payment.
(2) In case of transfer, the transferee must know by whom and
how the transfer can be made.
B. Authentication by Person or Entity Whose Credit is Pledged
For an instrument to have worth in money, someone must undertake to pay it even when others do not. At the time of issuance this
is the maker of a note or the drawer of the draft. Obviously, he must
indicate his undertaking on the instrument. Traditionally, this is by
his signature, usually found in the lower right corner. However,
''signed" really means any overt act which "authenticates" the
undertaking.'
An "X" or a thumbprint will do. Entities, such as
corporations and trusts and officeholders, can authenticate only
through real persons who do so in a legally acceptable and authorized
manner.
C Worth of the Paper in Money
It must not be necessary for a holder to employ a computer or
mathematician to determine how much money he will receive when
the instrument is paid. The sum payable must be certain-i.e., readily
ascertainable from the face of the instrument.'8 Nothing prevents
terms which add to or decrease that sum, such as interest or prepayment rebates, so long as the amount remains ascertainable.' '
Altieri, 41 D.&C.2d 90, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 40 (Monroe County Ct., Pa. 1965); Fidelity Trust Co.
v. Gardiner, 191 Pa. Super. 17, 155 A.2d 405, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 214 (1959), Annot. Willier &
Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-112, A3; Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Brightside Mfg., Inc., 59
Misc.2d 108, 298 N.Y.S.2d 197, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 167 (Super. Ct., 1969); Fairfield County
Trust Co. v. Steinbrecher, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 405, 255 A.2d 144, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 682 (1968);
Westerly Hospital v. Higgins, 256 A.2d 506, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1072, (R.I. 1969); Newby v.
Armour Agricultural Chem. Co., 119 Ga. App. 650, 168 S.E.2d 652, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 829
(1969); A. M. Castle & Co. v. Bagley, 467 P.2d 408, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 816 (Utah 1970).
15. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(d), 3-110.
16. U.C.C. § 3-111.
17. U.C.C. § 1-201(39).
18. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b).
19. U.C.C. § 3-106.
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Payment of money, whether foreign or domestic, is the essential
obligation; "payment" in goods, services, or other property is not
acceptable.
D. When Payment Can Be Obtained
One taking an instrument wants to know not only how much it is
worth, but also when it is payable. Thus, an instrument must be
payable either on demand (that is, any time after its issuance) or at a
definite, that is, a specific date or one measurable by the terms of the
2
instrument on which in all events payment will be made. 0 If the

instrument states a definite time, it may also contain terms allowing

the holder to demand payment earlier or to grant additional time.'
If the instrument states no maturity date, it is payable on demand.2 2
E. Certainty of Payment Without Irrelevant
or Extraneous Hindrances
For an instrument to be transferred freely with each transferee
giving something of worth for it, it cannot require that the holder
investigate obligations and events other than the obligations to pay
contained in the instrument itself. As the statute says, the promise or
2
order must be "unconditional" and singular. 3 Language or terms
having to do with other obligations, or which are explanatory of the
underlying transaction or the source of payment, do not necessarily
2
affect the promise or order. 4 On the other hand, obligations subjected to extraneous agreements or restricted to sole' sources of
'
payment are clearly beyond the pale of "unconditional."
20. U.C.C. § § 3-104(1)(c), 3-108, 3-109. See, e.g., Standard Premium Plan Corp. v.
Hirschorn, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 163 (N.Y. Super. Ct., N.Y. County, 1968), wherein the court held
an agreement payable in installments not indefinite as to time of payment. When a note is
payable "within a certain period" it is synonymous with being payable "on or before" a
certain date and therefore is payable at a definite time within § 3-109(1)(c). Ferri v. Sylvia,
214 A.2d 470, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 52 (R.I. 1965), Annot., Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest
§ 3-109, Al.
21. U.C.C. § 3-109. But a note providing for payment on demand or by installments in
the event of no demand is not a demand note. C & Z, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm., 6 U.C.C.
Rep. 1080 (Okla. Super. Ct., 1969).
22. The holder of a note may demand payment in cash to the exclusion of payment by
certified check. Olin of N.Y., Inc. v. Weintraub, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 623 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Nassau
County 1965). Holliday v. Anderson, 428 S.W.2d 479, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 514 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968), Annot. Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-407, A9. Note "payable at sight
when approved" is a demand note. Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 5
U.C.C. Rep. 519 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Bronx County 1968).
23. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b).
24. U.C.C. § 3-105.
25. U.C.C. § 3-105(2).
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III
IMPORTANCE OF FORM: GUIDELINES FOR INTERPRETATION

A. "Strict" or "Liberal" Constructionof Section 3-104
Whether an instrument is within the scope of Article 3 is wholly a
matter of form.2 6 If any of the requisites of Section 3-104 are
lacking, Article 3 does not apply in any litigation involving the in-

strument.2 7 The applicability of Article 3 must be determined from
the instrument itself, without reference to other documents or oral
agreements. The "four-corners test" is still applicable: the determination of negotiability under Article 3 must be made by inspecting
only the instrument itself.2 8
Form has always played an important role in the law of negotiable
instruments. Initially, form was used to avoid the medieval restrictions on assignability. With the development of the law of assignments, the form of negotiable instruments took on a different significance. Since the law gave special qualities to some, but not all,
promises and orders, it was necessary to be able to tell exactly which
promises and orders acquired those qualities. This is one of the functions that the requisites of negotiability now perform. This function
is most dramatically illustrated by the requirement that the promise
or order must run either "to bearer" or "to order." Although the
distinction between order paper and bearer paper is important, 2 9 a
primary function of this requirement is as a signal of what constitutes negotiable paper. The law could just as well say that paper,
to be negotiable, "must be printed on red or green paper."
Another purpose of form at the present time relates to the choice
of the types of promises that will be endowed with the special attributes of negotiability. It has been frequently said that only paper
that is readily transferable in the marketplace should be negotiable,
and that this is the rationale behind most of the present requirements
26. "It will be noted that the formal requisites of negotiability (§ 3-104) go to matters
of form exclusively .... " Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 3-103. See also, Associates
Discount Corp. v. Elgin Organ Center, Inc., 375 F.2d 97, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 36, (7th Cir. 1967),
Annot. Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-403, A14.
27. Unless, of course, the element lacking is words of negotiability, e.g., "to order" or
"to bearer," in which case the Article does apply but no one can become a holder in due
course. See § I supra.
28. This is clear from the mandatory language of § 3-104, and from the following
language from the Official Comment to § 3-105 found under the heading "Purposes of
Changes:" "The section is intended to make it clear that, so far as negotiability is affected,
the conditional or unconditional character of the promise or order is to be determined by
what is expressed in he instrument itself...."
29. The distinction goes to the manner in which the paper must be transferred by the
payee.
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of negotiability. 3 0 For example, it is argued that only if the sum to
be paid is certain and clearly ascertainable from the instrument are
businessmen likely to buy the paper, and the paper should be
negotiable only if there is this likelihood. Thus, we have the requirement that the instrument state a sum certain.
The requisites of negotiability found in the Code and in the prior
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law are not necessarily compelled
by reason. They represent a policy choice by the draftsmen and
legislatures as to what type of promises and orders are to be given the
attributes of negotiability. Essentially, by stating the necessary elements of negotiability, the draftsmen of Article 3 have determined
the situations in which good faith transferees are given greater rights
than their transferor had. The decision could have been to permit all
assignees to take free of defenses and of adverse claims, or negotiability could have been restricted more than it has been under the Code.
Courts, in interpreting Section 3-104 and the explanatory sections
that follow, will continue to make policy decisions by expanding or
contracting the boundaries of negotiability. The factors that influence courts are, however, different from those affecting the legislature.
The draftsmen's basic premise underlying Article 3 is clear: only
those instruments that are readily transferable in the marketplace are
negotiable. The value of the instrument, assuming the solvency and
willingness to pay of the obligor, must be ascertainable from the
face of the instrument; the time that payment can be demanded
must be clear, and the promise or order must not be conditional.
These, and the other attributes of negotiability, effectively forward
this policy. Just how certain the sum must be, or exactly what constitutes a conditional promise, must be determined on a case-by-case
basis. In deciding these cases, courts should attempt to follow the
policies of the statute.
Whether a "strict" or "liberal" approach should be adopted by the
courts is a spurious question, and it is difficult to suggest any broad
approach to the correct statutory interpretation of the applicable
sections. Courts must balance the basic Code mandate that the Act
be liberally construed and applied to "permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement
of the parties"' ' with the limited purpose of negotiability that is
dictated by Article 3. Business practices are not to be burdened, but
30. Perhaps the most famous statement is found in Carlos v. Fancourt, 5 Term Rep. 482
(1794). See § IV for a discussion of this case.
31. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
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there must be a showing that the instrument under consideration is
consonant with the rationale for making instruments negotiable.
Two narrower considerations should be applied by the courts.
First, the reason for including the particular requisite, and its application to the general purposes of the Code and negotiability should
affect the court's decision. Second, in some, if not most cases, it is
important to take into account the reason that the questionable
clause was included in the instrument.
B. Importance of the Situation Giving Rise to the
Use of the Instrument
The question of whether an instrument is negotiable within the
meaning of Article 3 arises only in a limited number of situations.
Competent lawyers advising businessmen have no difficulty drafting
documents that meet the requirements of negotiability. The use of
standardized forms, with little variation across the country, also
tends to minimize problems.
One situation leading to a question of negotiability arises where
there is a business reason for including a clause that renders the
negotiability of the instrument doubtful. For example, in Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel,3 2 the issue was whether a note stated a
sum certain when it included a cause providing that it was to bear
interest after maturity "at the highest lawful rate." Apparently, the
note was drafted for use in several states where the highest interest
rate might differ, and the clause was convenient from a business
standpoint.
Excluding those cases where grossly incompetent professional
draftsmanship was the cause, the oniy other situation that frequently
raises the question of negotiability involves "homemade" notes
which are usually given in a noncommercial context.
The reason that the note was not drafted so as to avoid any
question of its negotiability is important in the decision of cases.
Where there is a legitimate business purpose for exclusion of the
questionable clause, courts should strive to interpret the instrument
and construe the Code in favor of negotiability. Section 1-102(2)(b)
dictates that the Code is designed to promote new business practices
and not to restrict commercial developments. Nothing in Article 3
contradicts that basic mandate. 3
32. 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964), Annot. Wilier & Hart, U.C.C. ReporterDigest § 3-104, A2. The case is discussed in § XII[11 infra.
33. The intent of those closest to the Code is indicated by the amicus brief filed by the
Permanent Editorial Board in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196
N.E.2d 847 (1964). The Board argued that the note in question should be held negotiable as
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Where an instrument is drafted by one of the parties to a noncommercial transaction, there is no reason to favor negotiability. It is
unlikely that in a private loan transaction either of the parties has
any thought that the instrument is to have the affects associated with
negotiable instruments. Litigation over such transactions should not
affect the growth and development of commercial law, and decisions
should be made in these cases as automatically as possible. Where, in
fact, the parties do execute an instrument that clearly meets all of
the requirements of negotiability, then the instrument must be considered negotiable; but in the case of doubt or ambiguity, the instrument should be denied negotiability.
There is little danger that this will frustrate the expectations of the
individuals. The only difficulty that can arise from such an approach
is that courts will use decisions restricting the scope of Article 3 in
cases between individuals dealing in a nonbusiness context as authority that a like approach is to be taken where the instrument is within
a commercial setting. However, the demonstrated ingenuity of courts
in avoiding similar but different precedents makes this unlikely.
C Omission of Section 10 of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law
Section 10 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law provided

that:
Terms When Sufficient.-The instrument need not follow the language of this act, but any terms are sufficient which clearly indicate
an intention to conform to the requirements thereof.
There is no comparable section in the Uniform Commercial Code.
Official Comment 5 to Section 3-104 explains the omission in the
following way:
This Article omits the original Section 10, which provided that the
instrument need not follow the language of the act if it 'clearly
indicates an intention to conform' to it. The provision has served no
useful purpose, and it has been an encouragement to bad drafting
and liberality in holding questionable paper to be negotiable. The
omission is not intended to mean that the instrument must follow
the language of this section, or that one term may not be recognized
as clearly the equivalent of another, as in the case of 'I undertake'
instead of 'I promise,' or 'Pay to holder' instead of 'Pay to bearer.' It
does mean that either the language of the section or a clear
the questionable clause did not adversely affect the transferability of the instrument prior to
default. This case is discussed more fully in § XI [11 infra. See also, United Milk Prod. Co. v.
Lawndale Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 392 F.2d 876, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 143 (7th Cir. 1968), in
which a letter and a telegram were held sufficient as a check under § 3-104(2)(b).
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equivalent must be found, and that in doubtful cases the decision
should be against negotiability.
It is doubtful whether any significance should be given to the omission of U.N.I.L. Section 10. Under the U.N.I.L., it is conceivable that
a note could have been made negotiable simply by stating on it "This
note is negotiable," on the ground that the parties thereby "clearly
indicated an intention to conform" to the act, but courts rejected
this argument.3 4 Under the Code, the result would be the same."
In other cases where the former Section 10 might be persuasive,
such as where the word "promise" is not used but some other term
that has the same meaning, it would also seem that the Code would
not change the law. In many instances, the Code specifically sanctions "substitute" language, such as the use of "assigns" instead of
"order" for words of negotiability. 3 6 Where the language of the
Code is not so explicit, negotiability still is unaffected so long as the
words used are "clearly equivalent" to that of the Code.
There is no doubt, however, that Comment 5 to Section 3-104
does indicate that close decisions should go against negotiability.
However, this must be viewed in light of the policy adopted by the
draftsmen of Article 3 limiting is scope to paper that is in fact
transferred freely in the business community. Where the instrument
is of this sort, there is no reason for treating the note or draft any
differently from the way in which businessmen treat it if it essentially meets the tests of the Article.
The argument is sometimes made that certainty in the law of
negotiability is essential and that decisions holding questionable instruments negotiable destroy certainty. 3 ' In actual fact, there is
little to support this position except that it sounds correct. The
lawyer does have to be able to draft an instrument that is clearly
negotiable, but this is relatively easy under the Code as it was under
the U.N.I.L. As long as the draftsman does not approach the border
of the doubtful zone, he can be assured that the instrument will be
treated as negotiable by the courts. But there is always an area where
the result is difficult to forecast, no matter how well the statute may
have been drafted. A rule that in all cases of doubt the court will rule
against negotiability is no different from a rule that in all cases the
court will hold in favor of negotiability, and neither rule has much
34. Moore v. Vaughn, 167 Miss. 758, 150 So. 372 (1930); Charleston Nat'l Bank v.
Lemkuhl-Shepherd Co., 97 W. Va. 284, 125 S.E. 241 (1924). Contra, Gray v. Gardner, 12
D.&C. 449 (Pa. County Ct. 1929); Essig v. Porter, 63 Ind. App. 318, 112 N.E. 1005 (1916).
35. See Official Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 3-104.
36. U.C.C. § 3-110.
37. See Britton, Bills and Notes § 11 (2d ed. 1961).
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use or persuasive force. Neither adds to predictability or certainty.
The only possible approach under the common-law system is to take
each case as it arises and to strive for results that are consistent with
the policy of the various Code rules, advance the basic Code principles, are in furtherance of legitimate business practices, and reflect
the reasonable expectations of the parties.
IV
NEGOTIABILITY BY CONTRACT OR ESTOPPEL

The English Bill of Exchange Act was the original codification of
the laws governing negotiable instruments. It covered only checks,
drafts, and notes, leaving other commercial instruments within the
domain of the common law. 3 8 When the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was first enacted, its authors took the position that it was
similar to the English act in scope, but it was not so limited by its
language and courts soon began applying it to any case in which the
question of negotiability was in issue. 3 9 However, there were strong
arguments for negotiability by contract under the U.N.I.L. 4 o
The approach of the Code is the opposite of that taken by the
U.N.I.L. Section 3-104 states that "Any writing to be a negotiable
instrument within this Article" (emphasis supplied) must meet certain requirements. Articles 7 and 8 also deal with "negotiable" instruments, and the Official Comments to Section 3-104 clearly state
that it was the intent of the Code draftsmen to permit parties and
courts to attach the attributes of negotiability to instruments that
come within none of the Code Articles.
Official Comment 2 to Section 1-102 states that:
[T]he Code seeks to avoid the type of interference with evolutionary growth found in Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150
N.E. 594 (1926). Thus private parties cannot make an instrument
negotiable within the meaning of Article 3 except as provided in
Section 3-104; nor can they change the meaning of such terms as
'bona fide purchaser,' 'holder in due course,' or 'due negotiation,' as
used in the Act. But an agreement can change the legal consequences
which would otherwise flow from the provisions of the Act.
And, Comment 1 to Section 3-104, in discussing the nonnegotiability
of instruments payable in commodities, states:
Even if retention of the old statutes [providing for the negotiability
of such paper] is regarded in any state as important, amendment of
this section may not be necessary, since 'within this Article' in sub38. Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 I11.L. Rev. 205 (1933).

39. See § I, n. 1, supra.
40. See Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 205 (1933).
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section (1) leaves open the possibility that some writings may be
made negotiable by other statutes or by judicial decision. The same
is true as to any new type of paper which commercial practice may
develop in the future.
Official Comment 2 to the same subsection also deals with this question:
While a writing cannot be made a negotiable instrument within this
Article by contract or by conduct, nothing in this section is intended
to mean that in a particular case a court may not arrive at a result
similar to that of negotiability by finding that the obligor is
estopped by his conduct from asserting a defense against a bonafide
purchaser. Such estoppel rests upon ordinary principles of the law of
simple contract; it does not depend upon negotiability, and it does
not make the writing negotiable for any other purpose. But a contract to build a house or to employ a workman, or equally a security
agreement does not become a negotiable instrument by the mere
insertion of a clause agreeing that it shall be one.
The approach of the Code has been severely criticized by one
writer: "The proposal to reject uniformity as a national goal is an
invitation to scatter some or all of the aspects of negotiability upon a
variety of nonconforming instruments, thereby increasing the area of
uncertainty in the law, rendering it more unpredictable and stimulating needless litigation."' 1
Such criticism harks back to an old English case, Carlos v. Fancourt,4 2 which has had a considerable influence on the concept of
negotiable instruments for the past two centuries. In the Carlos case,
Lord Kenyon and Judge Ashhurst both attempted to explain why an
instrument must meet certain formalistic requirements which have
become the formal requisites of negotiability under Article 3:
Lord Kenyon: 'It would perplex the commercial transactions of
mankind, if paper securities of this kind were issued out into the
world encumbered with conditions and contingencies, and if persons
to whom they were offered in negotiation were obliged to enquire
when these uncertain events would probably be reduced to a certainty.'
Judge Ashhurst: 'Certainty is a great object in commercial instruments; and unless they carry their own validity on the face of them,
they are not negotiable: on that ground bills of exchange, which are
only payable on a contingency, are not negotiable, because it does
41. Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability- The Negotiable Instruments Law Compared With the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1953).
42. 5 Term Rep. 482 (1794).
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not appear on the face of them whether or not they will ever be
paid.
'The same rule then that governs bills of exchange in this respect
must also govern promissory notes.'
Lord Kenyon attempted to express a rationale for his rule. His statement, however, is not valid. No one is ever required to purchase an
instrument, whether or not it is clear on its face when it is to be paid,
how much is to be paid, etc. If one wants to purchase a bill that is
payable only on a contingency, why should he be discouraged from
doing so by a rule that makes the instrument nonnegotiable? Lord
Kenyon does not face this question.
The argument of Lord Kenyon and others who simply said that
negotiable instruments must be like "couriers without luggage"
should be ascribed to the Code draftsmen in only a very limited
sense. The approach of the Code is different from that of the
U.N.I.L. The premise of Article 3 is that the attributes of negotiability are to be given only to paper that is in fact commonly transferred
in the business community. Since paper that is conditional, or whose
value is not clear from its face, does not normally circulate, it should
not be considered "commercial paper" under Article 3. But the real
question in any litigation is not whether an instrument is negotiable
or "commercial paper." It is whether the plaintiff or defendant
should prevail under the circumstances of the transaction, and this
will depend upon the rights and obligations imposed by the law. In
many, if not most cases, the ultimate issue is whether an alleged
defense can be raised by the defendant or whether he is precluded
from doing so by virtue of the plaintiff's position as a good faith
purchaser. This issue can be hidden from view by letting it depend
solely upon whether the instrument meets the requirements of a
statute, but there is no guarantee that this will render the law any
more certain or decrease litigation. In fact, it may have just the
opposite effect, for it would force the courts to stretch and strain the
statutory language to find negotiability under the statute where the
equities of the case were clearly with the plaintiff.
The law could take the position that defenses are cut off whenever
property is transferred to a good faith purchaser. Neither the common law nor any of the Code Articles go that far. Such a position is
probably unwise. Certainly, there is no need for Article 3 to go that
far. Its purpose is simply to provide a convenient method by which
4
the commercial community can create a money substitute. 3 Once it
43. "To the argument that this will destroy uniformity, the author would reply, at the
risk of oversimplification, that all needs of uniformity are met if a central core of uniformity exists. With such a core, the lawyer representing a client with multi-state or even
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has accomplished this goal it has served its purpose, and it need not,
and should not, prohibit parties from so arranging their deal as to
accomplish some of the same purposes. Except perhaps for situations
involving contracts of adhesion, no purpose is served by restricting an
individual's freedom to waive his right to assert defenses as against a
subsequent transferee. 4 '

Likewise, there is no advantage in restricting the courts from using
the well-developed principle of estoppel in appropriate cases to accomplish results similar to those worked by the statute. The most
significant jurisprudential accomplishment of the Uniform Commercial Code is its approach to the problem of drafting statutes for
use in a common-law country. It is truly a "common-law code"
designed for use in a society that has a tradition of case-made law. It
is a statute designed to complement, and to be complemented by,
decisional law, and Article 3 reflects this approach. It provides for
certainty where it is needed, giving to the lawyer a method of accomplishing the results of negotiability without fear that a court will
upset his plans. It leaves to the courts the settlement of cases where
the parties have not so provided in the documents they used, but
where circumstances indicate that similar results are desirable.
V
IN WRITING
The Code definition4" of "written" is capable of some rather
unusual interpretations. For example, the catchall phrase "or any
other intentional reduction to tangible form" could include recordings of various types and information electronically stored. It is unlikely, however, that there will be much difficulty with this requirement in practice. Where doubt exists as to whether there is a writing,
the better rule is to hold that no negotiable instrument, as defined by
Article 3, exists. There is a definite policy to include within this
international operations can devise an instrument clearly negotiable anywhere." Leary,
Article 3 Commercial Paper,Uniform Commercial Code Handbook 87, 91 (1964).
44. Article 9 specifically provides for one of the attributes of negotiability where the
parties so provide. Section 9-206 states: "Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or
lessee that he will not assert any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or
lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and
without notice a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted
against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial
Paper (Article 3). ....
45. " 'Written' or 'writing' includes printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to tangible form." U.C.C. § 1-201(46). This definition is broader than that of the
U.N.I.L. which stated that " 'Written' includes printed, and 'writing' includes print."
U.N.I.L. § 191.
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Article only those instruments which are likely to circulate freely, 4 6
and it will almost certainly follow that an instrument will not be
transferable in the ordinary sense where there is a question of
whether it is in writing.
Unusual cases, generally hypothetical, such as writings on a cake
of soap, on a cow,4 7 or on one's shirt,4" are useful for instructional
purposes, but pose no real problem in the commercial world. If,
perchance, such "instruments" were to find their way into litigation,
they should be held to be outside Article 3 because they serve no
function as commercial paper.
Section 1-201(46) does specify that writing includes printing and
typewriting. There is no question but that writing also includes duplicated instruments of any sort, e.g., mimeographed, offset, engraved.
There is no requirement that the writing be permanent or indelible,
and an 4 instrument written in pencil or other erasable form is sufficient. 9
Tangential problems may arise in connection with the use of data
processing equipment. At the present stage of this development,
there is a question whether the numbers imprinted on a check for
sorting and routing purposes are a part of the instrument. It is conceivable, for example, that a depositor could have two accounts in
the same bank, each of which would be assigned different account
numbers. In one account he may have a sizable balance, in the other
little money. If he draws a check using an instrument imprinted with
the number representing the account with little money, which would
overdraw that account but which would not overdraw the other
account, there is a question of whether the bank should pay the
check from the depositor's other account. If the data processing
number is a part of the writing, the bank should not pay as the order
would be for payment out of that account only.
In such cases, the number should not be considered a part of the
instrument any more than the bank's identification number and the
routing code symbol which are also contained on checks. The imprinted number is clearly a "reduction to tangible form" of information, but there is no indication that the customer had the intent to
adopt it as part of his writing.' 0 The number is for the convenience
46. See § § III, IV supra.
47. See Herbert, The Negotiable Cow, Uncommon Law 201 (7th ed. 1957).
48. As a humorous protest, a taxpayer in Albany, New York, attempted to pay his
federal income taxes with a check drawn on his shirt. His explanation was that they were
taking everything else he had so they might as well get the shirt off his back.
49. See Geary v. Physic, 5 B.&C. 234 (1826).
50. A contrary holding might render all checks so imprinted nonnegotiable as it would
mean that they are drawn against a particular fund. See § IX [41 supra.
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of the bank, and the check is a simple unconditional order on the
bank.
As the use of computers becomes more sophisticated, it is conceivable that the written check will be partially displaced by remote
computer units capable of crediting and debiting accounts at the
banks. A businessman may be able to pay his bills by pressing the
correct keys without leaving his office or store.'' Assuming this
occurs, it is unlikely that Article 3 in its present form will be satisfactory in settling disputes.' 2
VI
SIGNED BY THE MAKER OR DRAWER
"Signed" is defined in Section 1-201(39) as including "any symbol
executed or adopted by a party with present intent to authenticate a
writing." The Official Comment clearly states that a complete signature is unnecessary, and that the symbol may be printed, typed, or
written.' ' The general definition of "signed" is supplemented by
Section 3-401(2) which states that a signature may be made by the
use of "any name, including any trade or assumed name ... or by
word or mark used in lieu of a written signature."
Both of these sections lead to the conclusion that the signature
requirement of negotiability is easy to satisfy and that no particular
format is prescribed by the Code. Some caution is required, however,
in applying these sections. The definition found in Section 1-201(39)
is drafted for use in many situations. It applies to all ten Articles of
the Code and cases interpreting it for the purpose of one Article are
not necessarily useful in relation to cases arising out of another
Article. Section 3-401(2), although within Article 3, is aimed primarily at determining when one becomes liable, not whether the
instrument is negotiable.
In deciding whether an instrument is signed for the purpose of
satisfying this requirement of negotiability, the test should be
whether it appears from the face of the instrument that someone
undertook to assume the liability of a maker or drawer. An important consideration under Section 1-201(39) is whether the party
using the symbol intended to authenticate the writing. Objective
intent governs, and where the issue is whether the instrument is
51. A system presently being contemplated would employ the telephone as a remote
unit. See Next Stop in Banking: Pay Bills by Phone, Bus. Week, Nov. 13, 1965, at 82.
52. Suggested changes in the Code that would bring at least some of its provisions into
use were such a system employed are contained in a recent article, Dunne, Variations on a
Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposalsfor the Uniform Commercial Code and the Checkless Society, 75 Yale L.J. 788 (1966).
53. See also Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 3-401: "It may be made by mark, or even
by thumbprint."

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

negotiable, only the intent evidenced by the instrument itself is relevant. For the instrument to be within Article 3, the symbol alleged
to constitute a signature must be so written and situated on the
instrument as to demonstrate that it was adopted as a signature.
Section 3-402, and especially the Official Comment thereto, supports
this position although it deals with another question. Where the type
of liability assumed by a signor comes into issue, parol evidence
generally is not admissible to show the capacity.'5
There is even less
reason for allowing parol evidence to show the signor's intent on the
question of negotiability.
Official Comment 2 to Section 3-401 states that "Parol evidence is
admissible to identify the signor, and when he is identified the signature is effective." This Comment applies when the question is who is
liable, i.e., who adopted a symbol or mark which does not on its face
identify any one individual. Evidence extrinsic to the instrument
should not be admitted to determine whether the instrument is
negotiable.' s
If a name or other mark appears in the lower right-hand corner of
an instrument containing the other requisites of negotiability, the
instrument is clearly negotiable, even though the alleged maker or
drawer denies that he ever signed it or that he intended to authenticate it by the adopted mark." 6 He can, of course, raise forgery or
fraud in the execution as a defense, but this is a question separate
from the issue of negotiability.
Instruments that are not subscribed have the potential of causing
the most trouble. The Official Comments to both Sections 3-401 and
1-201(39) evidence an intent by the draftsmen to continue the preCode rule that a signature need not be subscribed, at least for the
purpose of imposing liability.5 " The example used by the Comment,
"I, John Doe, promise to pay-" is common. The Comment does not
require a decision in all cases that the instrument is negotiable when
in this form, and although the inclusion of the name "John Doe"
satisfies the requirement that an instrument be signed in many cases,
it does not in others. For example, if the instrument is wholly typewritten and there is a signature line in the normal position which has
54. U.C.C. § 3-402. The Official Comment states that the section is designed to provide
that "any ambiguity as to the capacity in which a signature is made must be resolved by a
rule of law tfhat it is an endorsement. Parol evidence is not admissable to show any other
capacity, except for the purpose of reformation ..
55. See Official Comment 8 to U.C.C. § 3-105.
56. See New Waterford Bank v. Morrison Buick, Inc., 38 D.&C.2d 371, U.C.C. Rep. 426
(Lawrence County Ct., Pa., 1965), Annot. Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-304,
A5, in which a check with two signature lines but only one signature was held negotiable.
57. This is in accord with pre-Code caselaw. See, e.g., Donohoe's Estate, 271 Pa. 554,
114 A. 878, 20 A.L.R. 392 (1922).
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not been completed, the instrument should be held to be nonnegotiable. If, on the other hand, a typewritten instrument contained
no place for a subscribed signature, and the name of "John Doe" was
inserted in handwriting, the instrument is "signed" for the purposes
of Section 3-104. s 8
The Official Comment to Section 1-201(39) indicates that a signature may be found in a letterhead or billhead. This question arises
most frequently where a writing is necessary to satisfy statute of
fraud sections in other Articles of the Code, and it was probably
these cases that caused inclusion of the Comment. In the statute of
fraud cases, there is good reason to stretch the concept of "signed"
to permit the plaintiff to introduce proof of the alleged contract.
There is no similar policy favoring an expanded definition of
"signed" where negotiable instruments are concerned. A letterhead
or billhead should normally not be sufficient by itself to satisfy the
signature requirement of negotiability. It is unlikely that such instrument would be transferable, and there is little intent from the face of
the instrument that the letterhead or billhead was intended to operate as a signature.
VII
WHO IS LIABLE
Separate from the issue of whether an instrument is negotiable, is
the question of who becomes liable when an instrument is signed and
the extent of that liability. The nature of the liability assumed by
various parties to an instrument is discussed elsewhere. This section treats the following problems: (1) pleading and proof surrounding the authenticity of a signature; (2) the type of liability undertaken by a party signing; (3) signatures by agents; (4) the liability of
forgers and agents who sign without authority; and (5) plural signatures.
No person is liable on an instrument governed by Article 3 unless
his signature appears on it.' 9 Conversely, one whose signature does
appear must pay according to his contract unless he can establish a
defense. A signature can be made by any word or mark, so long as it
was adopted by the signor to indicate his liability. A duly authorized
58. See Garden Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 25 App. Div. 2d
137, 367 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1966), 3 U.C.C. Rep. 355, aff'd mem. 18 N.Y.2d 941, 277
N.Y.S.2d 141, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 322, in which an unsigned cashier's check was held nonnegotiable.
59. U.C.C. § 3-401(1). As will be seen, there is one situation where this is not quite true.
Where one signs another's name without authority, the signor is liable as though he signed
his own name. U.C.C. § 3-404(1).
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representative can sign for his principal, and if an agent with authority signs, the principal is liable just as though he himself had
signed. 6
When an agent signs with authority, the agent undertakes no
liability, provided he indicates that he is signing in a representative
capacity and discloses his principal. 6 ' Where, however, an agent who
has no authority to do so purports to sign for another, the agent
becomes liable just as though he had signed his own name because
the unauthorized signature operates as the signature of the forger.6 2
Since there are several types of liability that one can undertake on
an instrument, e.g., that of a drawer, endorser, or acceptor, it is
important to determine the liability undertaken by a person affixing
his signature. Where there is doubt, the Code says that a signature is
to operate as an endorsement. 6 3
Often, two or more parties sign in the same capacity, e.g., as
makers. Generally, under the Code, they become jointly and severally liable.6 4
A. Necessity of Signaturefor Liability: Use
of Mark or Assumed Name: Parol Evidence
In order for one to be liable on a negotiable instrument, his signature must appear on it. There are no exceptions to this rule under the
Code, outside of the case where one signs for another without authorization. Of course, there may be liability based upon the transaction giving rise to the instrument. Thus, if a corporation obtains a
benefit from a deal, the fact that one of its agents signed a note
promising to pay for the benefit will not relieve the corporation from
paying even though the corporation was not named by the agent.6"
But, the liability will be based upon the underlying contract or on a
count sounding in quasi-contract. Undisclosed principals can still be
liable on a transaction, but not upon any instrument given by their
agents as part of the deal.
60. U.C.C. § 3-403(1); Jenkins v. Evans, 31 App. Div.2d 597, 295 N.Y.S.2d 226, 5
U.C.C. Rep. 1185 (1968), Annot., Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-403, A18.
61. U.C.C. § 3-403.
62. U.C.C. § 3-404(1).
63. U.C.C. § 3-402.
64. U.C.C.§ 3-118(e).
65. "Nothing in this section is intended to prevent any liability arising apart from the
instrument itself. The party who does not sign may still be liable on the original obligation
for which the instrument was given, or for breach of any agreement to sign, or in tort for
misrepresentation, or even on an oral guaranty of payment where the statute of frauds is
satisfied. He may of course be liable under any separate writing. The provision is not
intended to prevent an estoppel to deny that the party has signed, as where the instrument
is purchased in good faith reliance upon his assurance that a forged signature is genuine."
Official Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 3-401.
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Under pre-Code law, a promise to accept a draft in a separate
document was enforceable as an acceptance whether made before or
after the draft was issued. 6 6 "Virtual" and "collateral" acceptances
no longer are enforced as acceptances under the Code. 6 However,
an attempted acceptance of the draft of the instrument is tantamount to a promise to accept and it will have much the same effect
as an actual acceptance. 6 8 If anyone changes his position in reliance
upon the promise to accept, this will constitute consideration for the
promise to accept and make it enforceable. 6 9 However, the action
will not be on the instrument, but upon the promise.
The definition of "signed" in Section 1-201(39) is augmented by
Section 3-401(2) which provides that "a signature is made by the use
of any name, including any trade or assumed name, upon an instrument, or by any word or mark used in lieu of a written signature."
That the inclusion of this more detailed section in Article 3 does not
preempt the general definition in Article 1 is indicated by the Definitional Cross References following Section 3-401 which refers to
Section 1-201. The two definitions are compatible and Section
1-201(39) is necessary to an understanding of Section 3-401(2). In
fact, the more detailed definition in Section 3-401 adds little or
nothing to the general definition and the draftsmen's purpose in
including it is not clear. An intent to authenticate is obviously neces-

sary under Article 3. Section 3-401 fails to specifically require this,
but Section 1-201(39) does.
Since the use of a word or mark other than the signor's own name
does not identify him, parol evidence is obviously admissible to
supply the connection. 7" Where local non-Code law requires that a
66. U.N.I.L. § § 134, 135.
67. U.C.C. § 3-410.
68. See U.C.C. § 3-409 and Official Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 3410.
69. See Clinch County Bank v. Wyatt-Proch Lumber Co., 82 Pa. Super. 305 (1923);
Nelson v. First Nat'l Bank, 48 Ill. 36 (1868). Hart, Credit Cards and the VirtualAcceptance,
1 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 209 (1960).
70. "Note that uncertainty as to the admissibility of parole evidence has arisen in a few
cases where attempts have been made to prove that an authorized agent's signature, appearing alone on the instrument, was in reality the trade or assumed name of the principal under
U.N.I.L. § 18 (N.Y.N.I.L., § 37). See Manufacturer's Bank v. Love, 13 App. Div. 561, 43
N.Y.S. 812 (4th Dep't 1897), above; and National Deposit Bank of Owensboro v. Ohio Oil
Co., 240 Ky. 288, 62 S.W.2d 1048 (1933). This problem would remain; it would not be
solved by the Code....
"This leads to the rather surprising conclusion, relevant to Section 3-401(1), that whereas
it is an established rule that parol evidence is not admissible to render liable on the instrument a person whose name does not appear on it, such evidence is admissible to prove that
whatever does appear on the instrument-even something which might, on occasion, look
like an agent's signature-is actually the person's signature in disguise, in the form of a trade
or assumed name. Thus parol evidence does, after all, render him liable as a party.
"While this may seem anomalous, the issue, after all, is one of fact. It is not perceived
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signature by mark be witnessed or otherwise proved in a particular
way, the rule prevails under the Code. 7' Similarly, although neither

the Code nor the Comment specifically so state, general requirements
for a valid corporate signature should be the same for commercial

paper. Thus, if a statute or corporate charter requires that a signature
by an authorized officer be countersigned by another officer, or that
the corporate seal be affixed, this would be necessary to effectuate a
signature by the corporation.
Article 3 does not refer to non-Code statutes that provide a presumption of validity when signatures are sealed or witnessed
although this is specifically mentioned in the Comment to Section
2-203 which discusses the use of a seal in contracts for the sale of
goods. 7 2 Such statutes would not be repealed by the general repealer
section of the Code, are not inconsistent with any section in Article
3, and should be given effect. In practice, Section 3-307 will probably lead to results similar to those reached under non-Code provisions.
B. ProofRequired to EstablishAuthenticity of Signatures
Most signatures identify a particular person, e.g., David D. Drawer,
but they do not, of themselves prove that this person actually wrote
the signature. Common experience, however, shows that forgeries are
uncommon. The Code recognizes that contests over whether thy
person actually signed his name are rare and provides: (1) if a signature is not specifically denied in the pleadings, it is admitted; and (2)
where properly denied, the burden of establishing 7 3 a signature's
that harm can result from permitting occasional incursions into the general principle stated
by subsection 3-401(1) when the particular facts are such as to make out a case of trade or
assumed name under subsection 3-401(2).
"There would be no change in the rule, either, that an undisclosed principal cannot, by
parol evidence, be rendered liable on a negotiable instrument unless his signature-in some
form or other-does appear there. Such evidence would be inadmissible to show that the
payee or other holder had always understood that the agent signed merely as an agent and
that the principal was liable instead." 2 N.Y. L. Rev., Comm'n Study of the U.C.C., 981
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (1965).
71. "This section [U.C.C. § 3-401] is not intended to affect any local statute or rule of
law requiring a signature by mark to be witnessed, or any signature to be otherwise authenticated, or requiring any form of proof." Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 3-401.
72. The seal still has some efficacy under Article 3 where the general law of the state has
not abolished it. It might be argued that Section 3-307 is in conflict with state statutes
giving presumptive effect to the validity of sealed signatures. Close comparison of the Code
section with the particular non-Code statute in question is necessary to make a final determination.
73. " 'Presumption' or 'presumed' means that the trier of fact must find the existence of
the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of
its non-existence." U.C.C. § 1-201(3 1).
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authenticity is on the party claiming under it, but there is a presumption 7 4 of its authenticity."
A general denial by a defendnt will not put into issue the authenticity of his alleged signature, but a specific denial "on information and belief" will. 7 6 The validity of a signature may also be put
into issue by denying "information sufficient to form a belief" provided that local rules of procedure permit this.7 ' An answer omitting
a specific denial may be amended to include a denial, again assuming
that this is proper under local procedure.7 8
The only effect of a defendant's failure to deny the authenticity
of a signature is to admit that he, or his authorized representative,
did in fact write his name. Admission of the authenticity of a signature, or the failure to deny it, does not prevent a party from raising
the defense that the signature was procured by fraud. That is a
separate defense, which assumes that the defendant did in fact sign
his name. However, where the defendant intends to claim that the
signature was made by an agent who exceeded his authority, this
defense would be lost unless specifically pleaded as it is grounded
upon the effectiveness of the signature to bind the defendant.
Once the authenticity of a signature is put into issue by a proper
denial, the burden of establishing it is on the plaintiff, but the signature is presumed to be genuine except where the defendant is dead or
incapacitated at the time proof is required. "Burden of establishing"
a fact and "presumption" are both defined in Section 1-201, and
Official Comment 1 to Section 3-307 attempts to explain the practical effect of these terms. It states:
'Burden of establishing' is defined in the definitions section of this
Act (Section 1-201). The burden is on the party claiming under the
signature, but he is aided by the presumption that it is genuine or
authorized stated in paragraph (b). 'Presumption' is also defined in
this Act (Section 1-201). It means that until some evidence is introduced which would support a finding that the signature is forged or
unauthorized the plaintiff is not required to prove it is authentic.
The presumption rests upon the fact that in ordinary experience
74. " 'Burden of establishing' a fact means the burden of persuading the triers of fact
that the existence of the fact is more probable than its non-existence." U.C.C. § 1-201(8).

75. U.C.C. § 3-307.
76. U.C.C. § 3-307(1). "The purpose of the requirement of a specific denial in the
pleadings is to give the plaintiff notice that he must meet a claim of forgery or lack of
authority as to the particular signature, and to afford him an opportunity to investigate and
obtain evidence." Official Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 3-307.

77. Official Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 3-307. See Betsos,Modern U.CC. Litigation Forms,
4 Bender's U.C.C. Serv. § 3-307, Form 1.
78. Official Comment I to U.C.C. § 3-307.
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forged or unauthorized signatures are very uncommon, and normally
any evidence is within the control of the defendant or more accessible to him. He is therefore required to make some sufficient showing of the grounds for his denial before the plaintiff is put to his
proof. His evidence need not be sufficient to require a directed
verdict in his favor, but it must be enough to support his denial by
permitting a finding in his favor. Until he introduces such evidence

the presumption requires a finding for the plaintiff. One such evidence is introduced the burden of establishing the signature by a

preponderance of the total evidence is on the plaintiff.
If the defendant takes the stand and denies that he signed the
instrument, or that his agent was authorized to sign for him, this
would be sufficient proof to "support" a finding in his favor and the
case should go to the jury on the point. The question of the defendant's credibility would be for the jury to decide, but if they
believed him, and no evidence on this issue were presented by the
plaintiff, the defendant should prevail. Since the presumption has
been "overcome" it is of no significance and should not be mentioned in the jury instruction. In fact, from the Code definition of
''presumption" and "burden of establishing," the jury instruction
should simply be, "If you believe the defendant's testimony that his
signature was not authentic, you must find in his favor."
Where the plaintiff rebuts the defendant's evidence and brings
forward his own proof that the signature is authentic, the Code
definition of "burden of establishing" sets out this burden of proof:
The plantiff must persuade "the trier of facts that the existence of
the fact is more probable than its non-existance." This may be somewhat different than the burden of proof normally required by most
jurisdictions in civil suits, since the instructions are usually phrased in
terms of "the preponderance of the evidence." The Code standard
should be adopted in the appropriate cases. This will mean that
judges should charge in these cases that "it is the duty of plaintiff to
persuade the jury that it is more probable that the signature was that
of the defendant than that it was not" instead of telling them that
"the plaintiff must establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that the signature was valid."
C. Type of Liability Assumed by Signature
Assuming the authenticity of a signature, a dispute may arise as to
the type of liability the signing party assumed, e.g., whether he is a
maker, drawer, acceptor, or endorser. Section 3-402 provides that
one undertakes the liability of an endorser unless the instrument
clearly indicates that the signature was made in some other
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capacity. 7
Since the instrument must show a contrary capacity,
parol evidence is not admissible, even as between the parties, to
explain the intended liability of the signor. However, the Official
Comment states that usage and custom may be used to explain the
parties' intent.
A signature in the lower right-hand corner of a note or draft
normally is a clear indication that the signor is liable as maker or
drawer. 8 0 This is due to custom and usage for there is no Code rule
to that effect. Similarly, if the local custom is for a drawee to simply
write his name across the front of a draft to signify his acceptance,
this should be recognized.
The exclusion of parol evidence contributes to the certainty of the
obligations represented by a negotiable instrument; however, when
the rule is applied in litigation between the immediate parties to the
instrument, it may result in decisions that are apparently unjust. If,
for example, the defendant has signed on the rear of the instrument,
evidence could not be introduced to prove that he had agreed to be
liable the same as a maker, and if the plaintiff-payee failed to make a
proper presentment or to give notice of dishonor, the defendant
would be discharged not only on the instrument but also upon the
underlying obligation. This seems unfair, but it is no more so than
other results reached by application of the parol evidence rule to
written contracts. Since negotiable instruments are one of the most
formal types of contracts, the undesirable result that may be reached
in a very few cases should not be allowed to override the more
important policy of certainty.
When there is an attempt to hold someone as a drawer or maker
when he has signed in such a way to indicate that he is an endorser,
this amounts to an attempt to add a waiver of presentment and
notice to his signature. The plaintiff's argument, in effect, is that the
signor guaranteed payment. The addition of this element to the obligation implied by the law to his signature because of a parol promise
is directly contrary to the normal operation of the parol evidence
rule. Section 3-416, which distinguishes the contract of a guarantor
and imposes different liability upon him, also shows a statutory
scheme for determining liability only from the appearance of the
instrument and the language contained therein.8 1
Location of the signature may not be the sole determinant of the
79. See A. J. Armstrong, Inc. v. Janburt Embroidery Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 246, 234
A.2d 737 (1967).
80. See Official Comment to U.C.C. § 3-402.
81. See, e.g., In Re Ciccantelli, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 735 (U.S.D.C., E.D. Pa. 1968), wherein the
position of certain signatures, together with a printed legend on the instrument, were
determinative of the type of liability undertaken by those who signed.
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signor's liability. If, for example, three signatures appeared in the

lower right-hand corner of a note, and under two of the signatures,
the word "maker" was placed, the third signor should be held to be
an endorser. Since the liability of two parties is clearly indicated, this
creates an ambiguity as to the third person's liability. Also, if a note
reading, "I, Mike Maker, promise to pay" were signed by Mike Maker
and another in the lower right-hand corner, the other signor should
be held to be an endorser as the body of the note causes his signature
to be in an ambiguous capacity.
D. PluralSignatures

When two or more parties sign an instrument in the same capacity
and as part of the same transaction, they are jointly and severally
liable unless the instrument otherwise specifies.8 2 If this rule is to be
varied, it should be done so clearly. Section 3-1 18(e) specifies that
the rule applies even though the body of the instrument "contains

such words as 'I promise to pay.' " It seems clear that where the
instrument contains the words "We promise to pay," the parties are
also jointly and severally liable. 8 3

Successive endorsers are severally and not jointly 8 4 liable. In some

cases, this would be true even though they both signed to effectuate

the same transaction. For example, if the payee wished to have his
check cashed at a friend's bank and they both endorsed, the payee to

effectuate the transfer and his friend as surety, they should not be
held jointly liable. Where, however, an instrument is payable to two
or more payees, and all sign the instrument to transfer it, the apparent meaning of the Code is that they are jointly and severally
liable even though the signatures were made at different times. This
would be the result regardless of whether the payees were designated
82. U.C.C. § 3-118(e); Wilner v. Croyle, 433 Pa. 91, 252 A.2d 387 (1969), 6 U.C.C. Rep.
824; Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Roy, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 828 (Mass. App. Div., 1969). Where
both the corporate maker and its president signed the instrument without indication that
the president was signing in a representative capacity, both parties are presumed to have
signed in the same capacity and thus are jointly and severally liable. 0. P. Ganjo, Inc. v.
Tri-Urban Realty Co., Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. 302 (N.J. Super. Ct., Union County, 1970).
83. "[W] here the paper reads 'We promise to pay,' the persons signing have been held to
be liable jointly only. Sisto v. Bambara, 228 App. Div. 456, 240 N.Y. Supp. 121 (2d Dep't
1930); Lasky v. Lissik, 140 Misc. 826, 251 N.Y. Supp. 753 (Sup. Ct. Broome Co. 1931);
First Nat'l Bank v. Knickerbocker, 126 Misc. 467, 214 N.Y. Supp. 465 (Sup. Ct., Cortland
Co. 1926); see Welch v. Campbell, 197 Misc. 165, 94 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct., Otsego Co.
1950). Under subsection (e), such liability would be changed to joint and several." N.Y.L.
Rev. Comm'n Study of the U.C.C., Leg. Doc. No. 65 (1955). For cases so holding, see
Ghitter v. Edge, 118 Ga. App. 750, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1253 (1968); Simpson v. Wages, 119 Ga.
App. 324, 167 S.E.2d 213, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 518 (1969).
84. U.C.C. § 3-414(2): "Unless they otherwise agree endorsers are liable in the order in
which they endorse, which is presumed to be the order in which their signatures appear on
the instrument."
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in the alternative if they both did in fact sign to transfer the instrument.
VIII
ORDER OR PROMISE TO PAY
Only instruments promising or ordering the payment of money
come within the scope of Article 3. This is a rather substantial restriction as it removes from the scope of the Article instruments that
either simply acknowledge the existence of a debt or request that a
third party advance funds. The restriction is arbitrary, but indicative
of the general Code policy of including within the ambit of Commercial Paper only those items which circulate as a money substitute
in normal commercial channels." s Although an IOU can in fact be
transferred by assigning the obligation that it represents, this is not
frequently done in the business community.
A. Order to Pay
An order to pay is defined as a direction to pay.8 6 It must be
more than an authorization or request. The distinction between a
"direction" and an "authorization" or "request" will be unclear in
some cases. Words of politeness, such as "please pay" should not
defeat negotiability. 8 What is required of the Code is a clear indication that the drawer is telling the drawee to pay. There must be some
sense of authority in the verb used. Thus, such verbs as order, direct,
command, instruct, and bid should be sufficient, whereas verbs such
as ask, request, implore, adjure, beg, entreat, supplicate, plead, etc.
may not be. Similarly, verbs such as authorize, empower, permit,
allow, let, and commission are generally sufficient. However, the
entire wording of the instrument should be given consideration and it
may be clear from other words used that the verb has a different
connotation. In view of the desirability of having negotiable
instruments clearly identifiable, in doubtful cases the court should
hold the instrument to be outside the scope of Article 3.
1. Drawee Must be Identified. The person who is to pay the
instrument must be identified with reasonable certainty.8 8 Under
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, it has been held that an
85. See § § 1, IV, supra.
86. U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(b): "An 'order' is a direction to pay and must be more than an
authorization or request."
87. "The prefixing of words of courtesy to the direction-as 'please pay' or 'kindly
pay'-should not lead to a holding that the direction has degenerated into a mere request.
On the other hand informal language- such as 'I wish you would pay'-would not qualify as
an order." Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 3-102.

88. U.c.c. § 3-102(1)(b).
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instrument order in form that did not name a drawee was negotiable
and that the person signing was liable as the maker of a note.8 9
Under an early draft of the Code, such a result would have been
difficult to reach as an order was defined as a "clearly expressed
direction to pay," and a promise was defined as a "clearly expressed
undertaking." 9" Under the present Code wording, the result of the
pre-Code cases would seem to be correct.
Section 3-118 gives force to this conclusion by providing that
where there is doubt as to whether an instrument is a draft or a note,
a holder may treat it as either. Although no promise is specifically
contained in an order instrument where a drawee is not named, it
would appear that the one signing did intend to undertake some
liability. It seems reasonable, in light of Section 3-118, to hold him
as a maker of a note as the liability of a drawer of a draft is conditioned upon the presentment and notice of dishonor. Presentment
obviously cannot be made on a nonexistent drawee.
Another approach, which reaches the same result for all interests
and purposes, is to hold the signor liable as a drawer, but to excuse
the requirement of presentment. 9' This tack, however, flies in the
face of the specific provision of Section 3-102(1)(b) requiring that
the drawee of a draft be identified.
Whether a holder can become a holder in due course of an instrument drawn in order form but lacking the name of a drawee is
another question. Section 3-304(l)(a) states that a purchaser has
notice destroying his status as a holder in due course where the
instrument is so incomplete as to call into question its terms. An
order instrument without a designated drawee would quite clearly
fall into this classification.
2. Plural Drawees. An instrument may be addressed to two or
more persons jointly or in the alternative, but not in succession. The
conjunction "or" would operate to make an instrument drawn in the
alternative. The conjunction "and" is not as clear an indication that
the drawer intended that the drawees be named jointly as "and" can
just as well be read to mean that payment can be demanded from
either named party. Although not directly applicable, Section 3-116
and the Official Comment thereto indicates quite clearly that "and"
should be construed as a designation that the drawees are joint. If the
instrument is payable in the alternative, any named drawee in
89. Ayub v. Saloman, 252 S.W. 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Didato v. Coniglio, 50 Misc.
280, 100 N.Y. Supp. 466 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
90. This was true only in the 1949 study draft of the Code. See Cosway, Innovations in
Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 284 (1951).
91. See U.C.C. § 3-511.
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possession may negotiate, discharge, or enforce it; if the instrument
is not payable in the alternative, it is considered payable jointly and
all named parties must join in negotiation, discharge, or enforcement.9 2 Section 3-118(e) provides that two or more parties signing
undertake joint and several liability unless otherwise specified.9
This section should not affect decisions involving the question of
whether drawees are in the alternative or joint as the issues are not
analogous.
The difference between joint or alternative drawees and successive
drawees turns upon the operative facts of a dishonor. If the drawees
are either joint or alternate, a refusal to honor the instrument by any
named drawee constitute a dishonor. If the drawees are successive,
then the drawee after a dishonor by one. Until all of the named
drawees refused to honor the instrument, there would be no dishonor.
3. Partnership,, Trust, Estate, or Unincorporated Association as
Drawee. It seems clear that an instrument may be drawn against a
partnership, trust, estate, or unincorporated association without destroying its negotiability. Section 3-105(h) indicates as much
although the section was apparently written with these entities in
mind as makers of notes.9 4

4. Drawer and Drawee Same Person. A draft may be drawn by
the drawer on himself without affecting its negotiability. When a
drawer draws the instrument on himself, it is effective not as a draft
but as a note. 95 Hence, there is no requirement of presentment or
notice of dishonor. In addition, the drawer may make the instrument
payable to himself.
B. Promise to Pay
A promise to pay is an undertaking to pay. It must be more than
an acknowledgment of an obligation. 9 6 Except as indicative of a
distinction between promises to pay and recognitions of obligation,
the definition is not of great help. Controversy can arise over instruments using language as: "I agree to pay," "I will pay," "I am obli92. U.C.C. § 3-116; Harry H. White Lumber Co., Inc. v. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank,
253 Cal. App.2d, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 617 (1967). Ins. Co. of No. America v.
Atlas Supply Co., 121 Ga. App. 1, U.C.C. Rep. 526 (1970). See also Katski v. Boehm, 249
Md. 568, 241 A.2d 129, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 49 (Ct. App. 1968), which deals with the effect of
one payee striking the names of other joint payees.
93. See § VII.
94. See § IX supra.
95. U.C.C. § 3-118(a). See also Comet Check Cashing Service, Inc. v. Hanover Ins.
Group, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 852 (N.Y. Civil Ct., N.Y. County, 1968).
96. U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(c).
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gated to pay," etc. Cases where this question arises are usually of
marginal importance to society and the development of commercial

practices and a court should lean toward nonnegotiability.
C. Instruments Payable at a Bank
A promissory instrument will operate as an order instrument when
made payable at a bank in those states which have adopted Alternate
In states which have adopted Alternate B,9 8
A of Section 3-121 .

the fact that the note is made payable at a bank operates only as a
designation of the place of payment. When Alternate A has been
adopted, the instrument "is the equivalent of a draft." This means
that all of the rules governing drafts are applicable. 9
Ix
UNCONDITIONAL NATURE OF PROMISE OR ORDER
The usual reason given for requiring that the promise or order
contained in a negotiable instrument be unconditional is that
promises or orders to be performed only upon the happening of a
condition are not acceptable in the commercial world as a substitute
for currency.' 0 0 No one has even proved this, and, in fact, whatever
evidence exists is to the contrary. Every case in which the issue of
whether a promise or order is conditional has been litigated repre-

sents a situation where someone has taken an instrument that is at
least arguably conditional.
97. Alternative A reads as follows: "A note or acceptance which states that it is payable
at a bank is the equivalent of a draft drawn on the bank payable when it falls due out of any
funds of the maker or acceptor in current account or otherwise available for such payment."
Alternative A has been adopted in Alaska, Conn., Del., D.C., Hawaii, Ky., Maine, Mass., Mo.,
Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Pa., R.I., Tex., Vt., Virgin Islands, and Wyo. 1 Willier &
Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-121 (State Variations).
98. Alternative B reads as follows: "A note or acceptance which states that it is payable
at a bank is not of itself an order or authorization to the bank to pay it." Alternative B has
been adopted in Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal. (with variations), Colo., Fla., Ga., Ida., Ill., Ind., Ia.,
Kan., Md., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mont., Neb., N.M., N.C., Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn.,
Utah., Va. (with variations), Wash., W.Va., and Wis., 1 Willier & Hart, U.C.C. ReporterDigest § 3-121 (State Variations).
99. Where a note was the equivalent of a draft under § 3-121, Alternative A, payee's
complaint was not insufficient for failure to allege presentment, because under § § 3-501(2)
and 3-502(l)(b) loss incurred by the maker was a matter of defense to be pleaded in the
answer with the tender of assignment of the defendant's rights against the bank. County
Restaurant & Bar Equip. Co. v. Shaw Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 290 N.Y.S.2d 377
(Nassau County Ct. 1968).
100. "The purpose of this requirement is obvious. Promises or orders performable only
upon the happening of specified conditions or subject to discharge upon the occurrence of
conditions subsequent are not suitable for general circulation." Britton, Bills and Notes,
§ 11 (2d ed. 1961).
"The usefulness of commercial paper would be seriously impaired if businessmen and
others proposing to take such instruments in commercial transactions were driven to weigh
the value of an order or promise in conditional form." Aigler, Conditions in Bills and Notes,
26 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1928).
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Actually, it is the law, and not the business community, that has
placed this restriction on negotiability. The law has determined that
the special attributes of negotiable paper should be reserved for unconditional promises and orders. There is, of course, some sense to
this decision. It is true that the type of promise or order that is most
likely to circulate as money is that which contains no condition to its
payment. Such paper is the best money substitute. By requiring that
the promise or order be unconditional, the law encourages the business community to make all of its money substitutes unconditional
thereby decreasing the problems that arise when the happening of a
condition must be proved. It also tends to exclude from the commercially oriented rules of Article 3 nonbusiness transaction where
the expectations of the individuals are different from those of businessmen.
A. Implied and Constructive Conditions
Section 3-105(l)(a) provides that an instrument is not rendered
nonnegotiable by the fact that it is subject to an implied or constructive condition. Thus, only express conditions affect negotiability.
The purpose of the section is to remove any doubt about whether
constructive conditions normally associated with contract law
destroy negotiability. For example, a buyer of goods normally does
not come under a duty to pay for them until and unless he receives
them. His obligation to pay is "conditional" upon the seller's performance. 1 0 ' However, if the buyer pays in advance by check, the
check is not a conditional order and is negotiable. 1 02
Although the Code does not expressly cover the question, it would
seem that an express condition which merely repeats a condition
implied in law or fact should not destroy negotiability. Thus, if an
instrument otherwise negotiable contains the language "payable only
if properly endorsed," the instrument's negotiability is not affected
by the legend.1

03

B. Statement of Consideration
An instrument's negotiability is not affected by the fact that it
101. While a check may contain an unconditional promise to pay, and thus be negotiable
in form, the promise is conditional as between the parties to the contract pursuant to which
the check was issued. Mansion Carpets, Inc. v. Marmnoff, 24 App. Div.2d 947, 265 N.Y.S.2d
298, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 68 (1965), Annot. Wilier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 2.511, A3.
102. For a discussion of the pre-Code law, see Simpson, Implied Conditions Affecting
Negotiability, 7 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 683 (1930).
103. For pre-code cases so holding, see Gordon v. Fifth Ave. Bank, 308 Pa.323, 162 A.
825 (1932); Whitev. Wadhams, 204 Mich. 381, 170 N.W. 60 (1918). For a case applying the
code in an analagous situation, see Glosser Stores, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 46
D.&C.2d 16, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 168 (Cambria County Ct., Pa. 1968).
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contains a statement of the consideration for which the instrument
was given even though the statement indicates that the consideration
has not yet been furnished. This provision, in Section 3-105(l)(b), is
simply an amplification of the rule just noted: Implied or constructive conditions do not affect negotiability. The Code also provides
that the negotiability of an instrument is not affected by the lack of
a recital of consideration.' 0 4
C. Reference to Underlying Transaction
It is fairly common to make reference in a negotiable instrument
to the transaction that gave rise to the issuance of the instrument.
The language used in making the reference is critical in determining
whether the instrument's negotiability is thereby affected. Generally,
if the reference is so made as to cause liability on the note to depend
upon the underlying transaction, the promise is conditional and the
instrument is nonnegotiable. Where, however, there is simply a reference to the underlying transaction, negotiability is not affected. 1 0 s
Under Section 3-105, the promise or order does not become conditional if it states "that the promise or order is made or the instru'1
ment matures in accordance with or 'as per' such transaction. " 06
Also, language indicating that the instrument "arises out of a separate agreement" does not affect negotiability, nor does a mere reference to a separate agreement.' 07 In addition, an instrument may
provide that it is drawn under a letter of credit without destroying
negotiability.' 08 However, the promise is made conditional if it
states that it is "subject to or governed by any other agreement." ' 09
104. U.C.C. § 3-112(1)(a). See Osias v. Miller, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 185 (N.Y. Super. Ct., N.Y.
County 1968).
105. "Here again it is not difficult to state what the law is-the promise or order must be
absolute and if the language of the instrument, fairly construed, amounts to making the
promise or order payable only on a condition, then there is no note or bill, consequently no
negotiable instrument. The chances for differences of opinion lie in the process of construction which must necessarily take into account not only the precise words used but their
position in the document, their relationship to the other language therein, even, perhaps, the
punctuation." Aigler, Conditions in Bills and Notes, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 471,484 (1928). See,
e.g., Anderson v. Consolidated Auto Wholesalers, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 205 (N.Y. Super. Ct.,
Bronx County 1967).
106. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(b).
107. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(c).
108. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(d).
109. U.C.C. § 3-105(2)(a). See, e.g., Opinion of the Comptroller General of the United
States, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 1176 (Nos. B-162984, B-162985, B-163056, Jan. 26, 1968), wherein
checks with qualifying notations referring to the underlying transactions were termed nonnegotiable; Webb & Sons, Inc. v. Hamilton, 30 App. Div. 2d 597, 290 N.Y.S.2d 122, 5
U.C.C. Rep. 524 (1968), Annot., Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 2-202, A13; N.Y.
Plumbers Specialties Co., Inc. v. Valco Homes, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 587 (N.Y. Super. Ct.,
Bronx County 1967).
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The fact that the words "as per" are within quotation marks in

contrast to other words of the section is not overly significant.
Clearly, the section indicates that it is always safe to use these
specific words in referring to another document, but clearly they are
not the only words that may be used without destroying negotiabil-

ity. The Official Comment' '0 indicates that the reason for putting
them within quotation marks stems from a definite split in the preCode cases as to whether these particular words operated to condi-

tion the promise.
Prior to the Code, some states placed considerable emphasis on the
collocation of the clause giving rise to possible nonnegotiability.
Where the questionable language, be it "as per," "subject to," or
something else, appeared to qualify the promise, the instrument was
held nonnegotiable. Where, however, it was so positioned on the

note, or within the note, as to indicate that it did not qualify the
promise, then the instrument was negotiable.' 1 There is no specific
indication whether the Code has adopted or refuted this test, but the
language of Section 3-105 would seem to indicate that it has rejected
it. Even if it has not, it would seem clear that use of quotation marks
around the word "as per" constitutes an express approval of the use

of those words as a term of reference that does not destroy
negotiability.
Section 3-119(2) makes it clear that the conditional or uncondi-

tional character of an instrument is to be determined from the terms
of the instrument itself.' '2 It does not depend upon whether the
agreement referred to is conditional. An instrument is nonnegotiable
if it contains "any language which, fairly construed, requires the
holder to look to the other agreement for the terms of pay110. Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 3-105 reads in part: "The final clause is intended
to resolve a conflict in the decisions over the effect of such language as 'This note is given
for payment as per contract for the purchase of goods of even date, maturity being in
conformity with the terms of such contract.' It adopts the general commercial understanding that such language is intended as mere recital of the origin of the instrument and a
reference to the transaction for information, but is not meant to condition payment according to the terms of any other agreement." See also D'Andrea v. Feinberg, 45 Misc.2d 270,
256 N.Y.S.2d 504, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 410 (Sup. Ct. 1965), Annot. Wilier & Hart, U.C.C.
Reporter-Digest § 3-105, A2.
111. See Aigler, Conditions in Bills and Notes, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 485-489 (1928).
Compare Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Calvert Drug Co., 144 Md. 303, 124 A. 891, 33 A.L.R. 1162
(1924), with Int'l Fin. Co. v. Northwestern Drug Co., 282 F. 290 (D. Minn. 1922).
112. The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 3-105 also says as much: "The section is intended to make it clear that, so far as negotiability is affected, the conditional or unconditional character of the promise or order is to be determined by what is expressed in the
instrument itself.... See also Milwaukee Acceptance Corp. v. Dore, 43 Wis.2d 412, 168
N.W.2d 594, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1065 (1969).
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ment."' 13 Hence, such pre-Code cases as United States v. Farrington I I are affirmed by the Code.
In one instance Section 3-105 does permit reference to another
agreement for a term. An instrument's negotiability is not affected
by a clause which "refers to a separate agreement for rights as to
prepayment or acceleration." ' 1 Thus, an instrument is not
rendered nonnegotiable by a clause reading, "Holder has the right to
accelerate payment of this instrument in accordance with the
security interest under which these notes are executed." Such a
clause clearly requires the holder to consult a separate document to
determine whether he can accelerate payment, but it neither conditions payment nor makes the ultimate time of payment uncertain. In
all events, the note will become due on the date provided in the note.
At the election of the holder, it may become due sooner upon the
happening of some event spelled out in the security agreement, but
this need not concern one purchasing the instrument unless he wants
to accelerate. Since the obligation to pay is not affected, only the
time that the obligation arises, it would seem that even the use of the
words "subject to" in connection with an acceleration clause in
another document should not destroy negotiability. For example, a
clause reading "acceleration rights of holder are subject to a security
agreement of equal date" does not condition payment on the provisions of the security agreement, rather it simply "refers to a separate agreement for rights as to

. .

. acceleration."

If an instrument contains no provisions as to time of payment, and
refers to a separate document for this term, it would be nonnegotiable. Although such a note could be considered a demand
instrument, this would not be the expressed intent of the parties.
Such an instrument indicates that specific payment terms have been
agreed upon, but that these are in a collateral document. Since the
collateral document must be examined to determine what the payment terms are, negotiability is destroyed.' 16
D. Reference to ParticularFunds or Accounts From Which
Payment is to Be Made
Under prior law a promise or order that was payable out of a
113. Official Comment 8 to U.C.C. § 3-105. See also First Nat'l City Bank v. Valentine,
309 N.Y.S.2d 563, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 821 (Super. Ct., Nassau County).
114. 172 F. Supp. 797 (D. Mass. 1959).
115. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(c). See, e.g., Opinion of the Att'y Gen. of Iowa, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
183 (No. 65-7-5, 1965).
116. "If the reference.. provides that payment must be made according to the terms of
the agreement, it falls under paragraph (a) of subsection (2)" and negotiability is destroyed.
Official Comment 3 to U.C.C. § 3-105.
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particular fund was held to be nonnegotiable on the ground that the
obligation to pay was conditioned upon the existence of the fund or
source named.' 1 7 This rule has been retained by the Code which
provides that "A promise or order is not unconditional if the instrument..., states that it is to be paid only out of a particular fund or
source." Exceptions are made, however, where the instrument "is
limited to payment out of the entire assets of a partnership, unincorporated association, trust or estate by or on behalf of which the
instrument is issued,"' ' 1 and where the instrument is issued by a
government or governmental agency or unit.' 1 9
Pre-Code law is also followed by the Code provision which states
that a promise is not made conditional where the instrument "indicates a particular fund to be debited or any other fund or source
from which reimbursement is expected."' 2 0 In these situations, the
theory is that there is no conditioning of the promise because payment is still due if the fund indicated does not exist.
Many of the reported cases involve a determination of whether
specific language in an instrument makes the instrument payable out
of a particular fund or constitutes merely an indication of the account or fund to be charged. The language of the Code is different
from that of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, and the
change may be of importance in some cases. Under the Code, the
promise becomes conditional if the payment is to be made "only"
out of a particular fund. The word "only" was not used in the
comparable U.N.I.L. section. It would seem that this would lead to a
different result in such cases as Gendora Bank v. Davis. In that case
the court held nonnegotiable a note that contained the following
recital:
This note is given in payment of merchandise and is to be liquidated
by payments received on account of sale of such merchandise.
Under the U.N.I.L., the question was whether this was a "promise to
pay out of a particular fund." Under the Code the issue would be
whether it was a "promise to pay only out of a particular fund or
source."
Although the Code allows an instrument to be payable only out of
the entire assets of a partnership, unincorporated association, trust,
or estate, payment is not so limited merely because the maker or
drawer signs on behalf of the entity. There must be a clear limitation
117. See Aigler, Conditions in Bills and Notes, 26 Mich. L. Rev. 471,472 (1928).

118. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(h).
119. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(g).
120. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(f). See also Farmer's Cooperative Livestock Market, Inc. v.

Second Nat'l Bank of London, 427 S.W.2d 247, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 88 (Ct. App. Ky. 1968).
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in the instrument restricting payment to the assets of the partnership
or association. Thus, a note signed "A.B.C. Partnership by A" is not
limited to payment solely out of partnership assets. All members of
the partnership are liable on the note under the rules of partnership
law. Even where the note contains a clause limiting payment to the
assets of the partnership, Section 3-105(l)(f) has no effect on the
liability of the partners; this would be determined by the partnership
law of the state. All the Code does is remove any question as to the
negotiability of the instrument. Non-Code law would likewise control as to the liability of members of an unincorporated association
where the instrument attempts to restrict liability.
E. Statement That Obligation Is Secured
Following the majority holding of pre-Code cases, the Code
specifically provides that a statement on an instrument that "it is
secured, whether by mortgage, reservation of title or otherwise,"
does not destroy negotiability.' 2 1 The only question covered by this
section, however, is that of negotiability. The section does not say
that a notation, "this note secured by a mortgage given by maker,"
makes an acceleration clause in the mortgage effective in a suit
brought on the note. Whether it does is a separate question.' 22 The
Code also provides that certain references to collateral are permissible without destroying negotiability.' 23
x
OTHER PROMISES, ORDERS, OBLIGATIONS, AND
POWERS GIVEN BY THE MAKER
In addition to a promise or order to pay a sum certain in money, a
negotiable instrument may include additional promises, orders, obligations, and powers specifically permitted by Article 3,' 24 as set out
in Section 3-112. The section is limited in its effect: It provides only
that the inclusion of the permitted terms does not affect the
negotiability of the instrument, and it specifically preserves all nonCode cases and statutes, such as prohibition against confession of
judgment clauses, that invalidate any term otherwise permitted by
the section.' 2 5
121. U.C.C. § 3-105(e);

Henry Blair & Co., Inc. v. Miller, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 65 (N.Y. Super.
Ct., N.Y. County 1965).
122. See § X supra.
123. U.C.C. § § 3-105(1)(e), 3-112(1)(b).
124. U.C.C. § 3-104.
125. U.C.C. § 3-112(2): "Nothing in this section shall val~date any term which is otherwise illegal."

July 1971]

COMMERCIAL PAPER

A. References to Collateral
Subsection (1)(b) of Section 3-112 provides that an instrument
may include:
...a statement that collateral has been given to secure obligations
either on the instrument or otherwise of an obligor on the instrument or that in case of default on those obligations the holder may
realize on or dispose of the collateral....
Where collateral is given to secure performance of an obligation,
this constitutes the creation of a security interest in the collateral by
the debtor.' 2 6 Article 9 governs this aspect of the transaction and defines the rights and duties of both the immediate parties and third
parties in relation to the collateral. If the note contains a description
of the collateral, a clause granting a security interest, and the
grantor's signature, it will be effective as a security agreement under
Article 9.' 2 If, however, there is no description of the collateral or
no granting clause, it cannot be used as a security agreement. Where
it meets the requirements of a security agreement, it may be filed
where this is necessary to perfect the security interest of the creditor
if it also contains the address of the debtor (maker) and both the
signature and address of the second party (holder).' 28
Often, however, notes referring to collateral do so only in a general way. "This note is secured by certain property deposited with
the Payee of this note" is a typical clause.' 2 9 Also, reference to
collateral is usually made only when the payee, or a subsequent
holder, intends to keep possession of the collateral until the obligation is paid. Where the debtor is to have possession, a separate
security agreement is normally drafted, and the note will refer to the
security agreement.
Although Section 3-112(l)(b) speaks only of a statement that
126. U.C.C. § 9-102.

127. U.C.C. § 9-203(1): "[A] security interest is not enforceable against the debtor of
third parties unless... (b) the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a
description of the collateral...." "Security agreement" is defined in § 9-105(1)(h) as "an
agreement which creates or provides for a security interest."
Two cases have held that a fmancing statement does not operate as a security agreement,
but the reasoning of the cases is subject to question. See Mid-Eastern Elec., Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 380 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1967), criticized in Wilier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest
§ 9-203; All American Card Co. v. H.M.H.C., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963), criticized in
Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 9-203, A6. See also 2 Hart & Willier, Forms and
Procedures Under the U.C.C., para. 92.03.
128. U.C.C. § 9-402.
129. Where the secured party has possession of the collateral, as is true .inthe case of a
"pledge" of the collateral, there is no need for a written security agreement. U.C.C.

§ § 9-113, 9-203.
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collateral has been given, neither a description of the collateral nor a
clause granting a security should destroy negotiability of the instrument.1 30 Even where a note has been changed by the deletion or
addition of particular items of collateral, this should not destroy
negotiability. In no way does this diminish the certainty of the
maker's obligation on the instrument; it affects only the enforceability of his duties.
Section 3-112(1)(b) also permits a statement that the collateral
13 1
obligation.
may be realized on or disposed of upon default of any
If such a statement does not spell out the holder's rights in any
detail, the provisions of Article 9 will be applicable and any realization or disposition will have to be made in accordance with the
mandates of that Article. 1 32 To the extent that variations in the
13 3
they may be included in the
rules of Article 9 are permissible,
note without destroying negotiability.
The section requires that the right to reach the collateral be only
in the case of default. If the lower Pennsylvania court cases involving
confession-of-judgment clauses are indicative, this requirement will
be strictly construed. The reasoning of those cases leads to the result
that a clause giving a right to dispose of the collateral not dependent
upon default would render the instrument nonnegotiable on the
ground that there was no definite time for payment. This problem
can be avoided by defining what constitutes default or by the use of
an acceleration clause. Acts prejudicial to the holder's ability to
collect, such as a diminution in the collateral's value, insolvency of
the holder, etc., may be stated as constituting a default, or such
events may be made acts that trigger acceleration.
Section 3-112(l)(c) allows a promise or power in the note to
maintain or protect the collateral or to give additional collateral.
Here, again, an acceleration clause or a definition of default is important to give the holder an immediate right of action on the instrument if the obligations are not fulfilled. Otherwise, the clause is of
130. The 1949 draft edition of the Code contained the following clause as § 3-104(3):
"A writing which purports to create or reserve security rights does not fall within this
Article, even though it also contains a promise to pay." This subsection was deleted before
the 1952 edition, which was the first version of the Code approved by the ALI and National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Leary, Article 3, Commercial
Paper, Uniform Commercial Code Handbook 87 (1964).
131. In Standard Premium Plan Corp. v. Hirschorn, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 163 (N.Y. Super. Ct.,
N.Y. County 1968), the court held the promise to pay in a note not uncertain, even though
it contained a clause granting the holder the right to cancel an attendant insurance policy
upon default.
132. U.C.C. § 9-501 et seq. See 1 Coogan, Hogan & Vagts, Secured Transactions Under
the U.C.C. § 18.01 et seq.
133. See U.C.C. § 9-501 for restrictions on agreements that alter the effect of the Code's
provisions on default.
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little value as it would give the holder only a right to sue on the
promise. For example, if the maker of a note promises to maintain
collateral with a value of at least twice the amount of the note,
unless breach of this promise is made to constitute a default or to
accelerate the time of payment, the holder's only remedy would be
to sue on the promise to maintain the collateral. Even assuming that
he could obtain an order requiring the debtor to increase the amount
of collateral, this would be of little practical value in many situations.
B. Confession-of-Judgment Clauses
Confession-of-judgment clauses are permitted by Section
3-112(l)(d), provided they are not invalid under non-Code state
law.1 3 4 However, the right to confess judgment may be authorized
only in instances where the instrument is not paid when due. Several
cases 1 3 s have already held notes nonnegotiable where the right to
confess judgment was not so restricted, and Official Comment 2 to
1
the section clearly indicates that this was the draftsmen's intent. 36
A confession-of-judgment clause may be coupled with an acceleration clause.' 3 ' Thus, an instrument could be subject to acceleration
"whenever the holder deems himself insecure," and upon acceleration the holder could be given the right to confess judgment.
In the majority of states, confession-of-judgment clauses are held
invalid by non-Code statutes, and in those states, the Code does not
affect the validity of the clause.' 38 However, the inclusion of a
confession-of-judgment provision, even in states that have outlawed
them, should not affect the negotiability of the instrument. The
instrument is negotiable, but that particular clause is unenforceable.
If a state prescribes procedures or requirements regarding confession
of judgment clauses, these are still operative and must be fulfilled if
the clause is to be given effect.
134. Westering v. Cheyenne Bank, 393 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1964); Reading Trust Co. v.
Wood, 39 D.&C.2d 117 (Montgomery County Ct., Pa. 1965); Katski v. Boehm, 249 Md.
568, 241 A.2d 129, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 49 (Ct. App. 1968).
135. Vain v. Gordon, 249 Md. 134, 238 A.2d 872 (Md. App. 1968); Atlas Credit Corp. v.
Leonard, 15 D.&C. 292, 56 Lane. L.R. 57 (Lancaster County Ct., Pa. 1956); Bittner v.
McGrath, 186 Pa. Super. 477, 142 A.2d 323 (1958); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 191 Pa.
Super. 17, 155 A.2d 405 (1959); Smith v. Lenchner, 204 Pa. Super. 500, 205 A.2d 626
(1964).
136. "As under the original Section 5 (a) [of the U.N.I.L.], paragraph (d) is intended to
mean that a confession of judgment may be authorized only if the instrument is not paid
when due, and that otherwise negotiability is affected." Official Comment 2 to U.C.C.
§ 3-112.
137. There may be some risk to this.
138. U.C.C. § 3-112(2).
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C. Waiver of Rights
Section 3-112(1)(e) permits "a term purporting to waive the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of any
obligor." This provision, like that allowing confession-of-judgment
clauses, does not affect non-Code law limiting the effect of a waiver.
Waivers may be made by any obligor on the instrument, and the
Code clearly contemplates waivers of right unconnected with Article
3. Thus, homestead exemption can be waived as well as the right to
but the
presentment or notice, without affecting negotiability,
1
"'
law.
non-Code
by
judged
validity of the waiver will be
D. Endorsement Constitutes Full Satisfaction
Section 3-112(1)(f) permits a clause providing that endorsement
or cashing of the instrument constitutes full satisfaction of an obligation. Again, the section does not determine what effect the clause
has on the rights and obligations of the parties; it deals solely with
the question of negotiability.
Section 3-802 provides that the giving of an instrument for an
underlying obligation normally suspends the right to sue on the obligation. If the instrument is paid, or the obligor is discharged by some
other act, there is a discharge of liability on the underlying debt. If
the instrument is dishonored, however, the obligation is revived and
the holder may sue either on it or on the instrument.
Section 3-802 can be varied by agreement.' 0 The Code does not
indicate whether a "full-satisfaction" provision making endorsement
or cashing of the instrument full satisfaction of the underlying obligation alters the result of the section and bars recourse on the underlying obligation when the instrument is dishonored, but such a clause
should not be given that effect. The normal reason for including a
full-satisfaction clause is to avoid any subsequent dispute over
whether the underlying obligation has been fully paid, where the
instrument is paid. The check operates as a receipt showing what
debt was paid, and also operates as a discharge of the entire obligation even though less than full payment is made. The drawer or
maker seldom, if ever, intends that it operate to restrict recovery to
the instrument in the event that it is dishonored. This position is
supported by the language of Section 3-802(3) of the 1952 version
of the Code. 1"41 That subsection, which dealt with the effect of a
139. See e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1969), where the court held a waiver of defense clause ineffective to give the holder of a
consumer-goods-conditional-sales contract the rights of a holder in due course and void as
against public policy.

140. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3).

141. In the 1952 Official Text of the Code, Subsection (3) to 3-802 read: "Where a
check or similar payment instrument provides that it is in full satisfaction of an obligation
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full-satisfaction clause, specifically gave effect to the clause only
where the instrument had been paid. If any change in the general rule
of Section 3-802(1) had been intended, the draftsmen would have so
provided in Subsection (3).
Traditional contract law holds that a debtor cannot discharge a
debt by payment of a lesser sum where his liability is not disputed
and the amount of his debt is certain.' 42 In such cases, there is no
consideration for the promise of the creditor not to enforce his right
to the amount not paid, or as some courts have held, no consideration for the discharge given by the creditor to the debtor. Where
there is a good faith dispute as to either liability or the amount
owed, the parties may enter into a compromise, settlement, or
accord and satisfaction.' 1 3 Also, some states have relaxed (or dispensed with) the necessity of consideration in such cases.' 4
Article 3 of the Code, as presently enacted in all states, does not
deal with this question. The 1952 Official Text did by including a
Subsection (3) to Section 3-802. It read:
Where a check or similar payment instrument provides that it is in

full satisfaction of an obligation the payee discharges the underlying
obligation by obtaining payment of the instrument unless he establishes that the original obligor has taken unconscionable advantage in
the circumstances.
This subsection was deleted from the Official Code in 1956 because "it evoked criticism on the ground that it would work hardship, and was open to abuse." ' Apparently, the intent was to leave
the question of the effectiveness of a full satisfaction clause to other
state law.
There is a certain mystique and confusion that has grown up
around the enforceability of full-satisfaction clauses. Such terms as
"accord and satisfaction," "settlement," and "compromise" only
cloud the question. In reality, the problems pertain to two requirements of a contract: (1) offer and acceptance, and (2) consideration.
The clause is an instrument, "endorsement or cashing of this instrument constitutes full satisfaction of all obligations owed payee,"
the payee discharges the underlying obligation by obtaining payment of the instrument
unless he establishes that the original obligor has taken unconscionable advantage in the
circumstances." Willier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-802 (Drafting History).
142. IA Corbin on Contracts § 175 (1963); 1 Williston on Contracts § 120 (3d ed.

1957).
143. 1A Corbin on Contracts § 187 (1963); 1 Wilison on Contracts § 128 (3d ed.
1957).
144. Cases are collected in IA Corbin on Contracts § 187, n. 10 (1963). Statutes in
some states also provide that where a sum less than the amount due is paid, the debt is
discharged.
145. Wilier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-802 (Drafting History).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

is clearly an offer to exchange the check for the payee's promise not
to sue on the obligation, or, in other words, for a discharge. Where
the instrument is taken by the payee and endorsed or cashed, this act
of the offer, and the first requisite for a
constitutes his acceptance
1
contract is satisfied. 46
The payee must be on notice that there are strings attached to his
use of the check-that he is to use it only if he is willing to accept the
terms of the full-satisfaction clause. Where the payee is a large
corporation whose clerks process payments, this may cause some
difficulty, but the Code's provisions on notice,' 4 7 although not
strictly applicable, should be persuasive.
Where there has been an offer and acceptance, the next question is
whether there is consideration supporting the discharge or promise
not to enforce the unpaid portion of the debt. The traditional rule,
stemming from the famous case of Foakes v. Beer,148 is that a debt
cannot be discharged by payment of a lesser sum. This rule applies,
however, only where there is no good faith dispute as to liability and
where the amount of the debt is certain. Where the obligor contests
either the existence or amount of the debt, in good faith and with
some reason, his payment of less than the full amount claimed has
traditionally been held to be sufficient consideration for the discharge.
The rule of Foakes v. Beer probably represents the majority view
of United States courts, but there is a respectable minority of jurisdictions that hold to the contrary and enforce discharges where a
lesser sum is actually paid, and the trend seems to be toward a
relaxation of the consideration requirement.1 4 9 Tentative Draft
Number 2 of the Restatement of Contracts (Second) preserves the
rule of Foakes v. Beer in Section 76A, but the Reporter's Comments
indicate that the desirability of the rule is doubtful.
Section 1-107 expressly repudiates the Foakes v. Beer doctrine
where the underlying obligation for which the instrument is given
arose from an alleged breach of agreement governed by the Code.
The section provides:
Any claim or right arising out of an alleged breach can be discharged
in whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or
renunciation signed and delivered by the aggrieved party.
146. But cf Hanna v. Perkins, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1044 (Westchester County Ct., N.Y. 1965)
in which payee's endorsement with the notation "Deposited under protest" was held to be a
reservation of rights in the face of payor's full satisfaction clause.
147. See U.C.C. § § 1-201(26), 1-201(27).
148. L.R. 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
149. 1A Corbin on Contracts § 187 (1963).

July 1971 ]

COMMERCIAL PAPER

521

The section requires (1) a written waiver, (2) the signature of the
creditor, and (3) delivery. All three requirements should be met by a
clause indicating that the check is offered in full satisfaction of the
obligation for which it is tendered. Although the legend or clause
may not be in terms of a waiver, in most cases this will be the clear
intent. In other words, the person offering the check is saying, "You
may have this instrument only if you waive any rights that you may
have to additional compensation." An endorsement of the instrument, even though done by a stamp, would be sufficient to constitute a signature, and the delivery would be accomplished when the
check was presented to the drawer's bank for payment and filed with
the drawer's account. The Official Comment indicates that the general requirement of good faith found in Section 1-203 is applicable
to a waiver or renunciation, but good faith means only "honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Discharges obtained
by duress or unconscionable bargaining would fail as not being made
"in good faith." This approach is consideration as such in the fullsatisfaction cases.
Thus, where the instrument is given in full satisfaction of an obligation arising out of a sale of goods, no consideration would be
necessary to make the discharge binding provided there was good
faith in making the offer.
E. Drafts in Sets-OrderEffective Only If No Other PartHonored
Section 3-112(l)(g) was added in 1956 at the suggestion of the
New York Law Review Commission. It provides that negotiability is
unaffected by "a statement in a draft drawn in a set of parts (Section
3-801) to the effect that the order is effective only if no other part
has been honored." For drafts to constitute drafts in a set, they must
contain this, or an equivalent, clause. The purpose of this subsection
is simply to insure that the clause does not destroy this negotiability.
XI
SUM CERTAIN
The essence of the requirement that an instrument contain a sum
certain is perhaps best expressed in Official Comment 1 to Section
3-106:
It is sufficient if at any time of payment the holder is able to
determine the amount then payable from the instrument itself with
any necessary computations.
The Code provisions do not always strictly follow this direction, but
the statement nonetheless indicates the fundamental characteristics
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of the requirement. As in other Code sections that describe the requirements of negotiability in defining sum certain, there is an attempt to resolve specific problems that have arisen under the
common law and the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.
A. Provisionsfor Interest
Section 3-106 provides that the sum is a sum certain even though
it is to be paid:
(a) with stated interest or by stated installments; or
(b) with stated different rates of interest before and after default of
a specified date....
This is an expansion of the language used by the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law which simply provided that "the sum payable is a
sum certain ... although it is to be paid: (1) with interest."
Perhaps the most important question raised by the change is
whether any implication should be drawn from the inclusion of the
word "stated." At least one commentator has said that it is meaningless,' 0I and there is one case to that effect. 1"' The question
arises where a note fails to specify a rate of interest but includes the
clause "with interest." It would seem that such a note is negotiable
because Section 3-118 provides that:
...unless otherwise specified a provision for interest means interest
at the judgment rate at the place of payment from the date of the
instrument, or if it is undated from the date of issue." 5 2
Although it could be argued that Section 3-118 deals only with the
construction of an instrument and not its negotiability, the section
would be meaningless if it were held that those instruments at which
it is aimed were not within Article 3 because they failed to meet the
requirements of Section 3-106. It is also significant that Section
3-106 does not require that there be a stated rate of interest, only
that the interest provision be stated.
Of course instruments without a stated rate of interest do not
meet the basic test of a sum certain: that the sum payable be ascertainable from the face of the instrument. To determine the interest, a
150. Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability- The Negotiable Instruments Law Compared With the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1953).
151. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964).
152. Under § 3-118, a note containing provision for interest but with no rate specified is
not materially altered by a later insertion of the phrase "at 6%," since 6% was the judgment
rate and thus determinative of the interest rate before alteration. Epstein v. Paskow &
Epstein, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 1066 (N.Y. Super. Ct., N.Y. County 1968). See also, Carr Estate, 436
Pa. 47, 258 A.2d 628, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 49 (1969); Whitestone Credit Corp. v. Barbory Realty
Corp., 5 U.C.C. Rep. 176 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Queens County 1968).
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holder must first consult Section 3-1 18 and then go to another
statute to determine the judgment rate of interest in the proper state.
If it is a foreign jurisdiction, this may take some doing, but in most
cases the interest due is not as important as the principal sum and
there is little uncertainty in fact. A potential purchaser of the instrument can usually make a pretty good estimate of what is due in
interest.
Although instruments payable simply "with interest" appear to be
negotiable under the Code, those that refer to a specific extrinsic
source for the rate of interest are nonnegotiable. Thus, instruments
which carry interest at the "current rate" are not within Article
3.'13 In one case, Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel,II 4 the
court held that a clause reading "with interest after maturity at the
highest lawful rate" was negotiable under Article 3. The decision, or
at least the rationale of the decision, may be peculiar to Massachusetts where the case was decided because that state has a statute,"5
outside the Code, providing that the interest rate for any obligation
is to be 6 percent in absence of a different agreement between the
parties. The court in Ingel held that this statute provided the highest
rate of interest in Massachusetts under the circumstances, and that
the note in question was no different from one that simply said
"with interest."
The reasoning of the Massachusetts court is open to question;' 5 6
153. "The computation must be one which can be made from the instrument itself
without reference to any outside source, and this section does not make negotiable a note
payable with interest 'at the current rate.' Official Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 3-106. Of
course, what the Comment says is not true in connection with notes that contain only the
clause 'with interest.' Interest at the 'current rate' may be objectionable on a different
ground. It is not a definite enough term, because there is no one rate that is the current
rate." See Leary, Article 3, CommercialPaper, Uniform Commercial Code Handbook 87, 95
(1964).
154. 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964).
155. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., Ch. 107, § 3 (1958): "If there is no agreement or provision
of law for a different rate, the interest of money shall be at the rate of six dollars on each
hundred for a year, but.., it shall be lawful to pay, reserve or contract for any rate of
interest or discount. No greater rate than that before mentioned shall be recovered in a suit
unless the agreement to pay it is in writing."
156. "The court did not really come to grips with the interest problem. It stated that the
term 'interest at the highest lawful rate' did not evidence an agreement to apply a rate of
interest different from the judgment rate and that a note containing a provision for interest
at the judgment rate would clearly be negotiable under § 3-118(d). However, assuming the
doubtful proposition that the term 'interest at the highest lawful rate' does not evidence an
agreement to apply a rate different from the judgment rate, the question arises whether the
term 'interest at the judgment rate' is a stated rate within § 3-106. Unless the interest is
'stated,' there can be no 'sum certain,' and unless there is a promise to pay a 'sum certain,'
the note is nonnegotiable by virtue of § 3-104. While it is true that § § 3-118(d) and
3-122(4) strongly imply that a note which bears interest at the judgment rate is negotiable,
it is also true that Official Comment 1 to § 3-106 states that a note does not contain a
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the decision, however, is correct on other grounds. The quoted language expresses an interest rate that is to come into play only after
maturity. Once an instrument has matured, it no longer has its function as a money substitute and it is immaterial whether it is payable
thereafter in a sum certain. No person can become a holder in due
course,1 5 7 and it will not circulate in the business community.
The Massachusetts decision leads, almost inevitably, to the conclusion that an instrument bearing interest "at the highest lawful rate"
before maturity is also negotiable. It would seem from the language
of the section and from the Comments that there is a requirement
that the amount be ascertainable from the face of the instrument,
and that such a clause should be held to destroy negotiability. This
requirement is unfortunate in at least one instance. There is good
reason for providing that the interest rate vary in line with the
market where a note is to be outstanding for some time. For
example, a provision that the interest rate is to be "at the prime rate
when and where paid" would be useful in a long-term note. There is
little real difficulty in evaluating the worth of such a note, and no
good reason why it should be held nonnegotiable. " 8
The rate of interest may vary before and after default or before
and after a specified date. If different rates apply before and after
a particular date, the date must be specified. Thus, an instrument
which bore interest "of 5 percent until maker becomes twenty-one
and 6 percent thereafter" would not be negotiable unless the day
upon which the maker became twenty-one was apparent from an
inspection of the note. On the other hand, the fact that the note is a
demand note or one subject to acceleration would not prohibit a
clause raising the interest rate after default. Even though the time of
demand, and hence the time of default, is uncertain, the policy of
the Code is clearly to approve of both acceleration clauses and
demand instruments, and Section 3-106 does not restrict the use of
different rates after default to situations where the day of default is
ascertainable.
Statutes providing for maximum interest rates or requiring disclosure of interest rates are not affected by the Code. The recently
enacted Federal Truth in Lending Act and the proposed Uniform
Consumer Credit Code require that interest be shown, in covered
stated rate of interest unless the 'sum certain' can be computed 'without reference to any
outside source.' Obviously, a holder of a note payable 'with interest at the judgment rate'
cannot compute the 'sum certain' without referring to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 107, § 3
(1958)." Wilier & Hart, U.C.C. Reporter-Digest § 3-104, A2.
157. See U.C.C. § 3-304(3).
158. See Leary, Article 3, Commercial Paper, Uniform Commercial Code Handbook 87,
95 (1964).
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transactions, in accordance with certain rules. Although a failure to
comply with these and other similar statutes will not destroy the
negotiability of the instrument, it may give rise to a defense.
B. Payment in Installments
Section 3-106 provides that the fact that an instrument is payable
by "stated installments" does not render the sum uncertain. This is a
restatement of the former law with no change.
C. Discountsand Additions
Section 3-106(1)(c) permits a clause providing for a "stated discount or addition if paid before or after the date fixed for payment."
This differs little from changing the interest after default, but taken
literally, the statutory language is more restrictive than that used by
the draftsmen in wording the clause permitting a different rate
after default. If a demand instrument contained a clause "the sum
due is to be discounted by 10 percent if paid upon demand," this
would technically fail to come within either the provision on differing interest rates or this provision. However, it would seem that such
a clause should not destroy negotiability as it is within the spirit of
both sections. It could be argued that the date fixed for payment in a
demand note is the date upon which demand is made and that Subsection (1)(c) applies. It could also be argued that the quoted clause
is, in effect, a change in the interest rate in the event of default.
It would also seem that Subsections (1)(c) and (1)(b) should be
construed to permit a discount, or addition, if the note were paid or
not paid on a specified date. Hence, a note payable on June 15, 1975
which contained a clause stating that "a discount of 10% (or of $50)
will be given if the note is paid on or before June 15, 1973" should
be held negotiable.
D. With Exchange
Under Section 3-106(1)(d), exchange dates may be added to or
deducted from the face amount of the instrument. Either a fixed rate
or the current rate may be made applicable.
E. Costs of Collection and Attorney's Fees
Section 3-106(1)(e) provides that the sum is not rendered uncertain by including a clause requiring the obligor to pay the amount
''with costs of collection or an attorney's fee or both upon default."
There are two minor changes from the wording of U.N.I.L. Section
2(5) which cover the same question:
(1) Under the Code it is clear that both an attorney's fee and the
costs of collection may be added.
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(2) The provisions for an attorney's fee and collection costs may be
made applicable upon any default under the Code, while the
U.N.I.L. provided for them only 'in case payment shall not be
made at maturity.'

F. Ambiguities in Stating Sum to Be Paid
Lack of certainty as to the sum to be paid can also result from a
failure to state the sum unambiguously. The most common case of
ambiguity results where the figures on a check or note fail to correspond with the amount as written out. In such cases, Section
3-118(c) provides that "Words control figures except if the words are
ambiguous figures control." Section 3-118(b) is applicable where
there are discrepencies between handwritten, typewritten, and
printed material on the instrument. It provides that "Handwritten
terms control typewritten and printed terms, and typewritten control printed." Where the application of one or both of these rules
results in a specific sum due, there should be no doubt about the
negotiability of the instrument.
XII
IN MONEY
To be negotiable within Article 3, instruments must be payable in
money. "Money" is defined in Section 1-201(24) as "a medium of
exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government as a part of its currency." This definition rejects the view that
only legal tender constitutes money. The medium in which the instrument is payable must, however, be sanctioned by some government as part of its currency, and the fact that there is a custom or
usage that a particular medium is acceptable is not sufficient. 1 5
Section 3-107 requires that the medium of exchange stated in the
instrument be recognized at the time the instrument is "made." It
would appear that this means at the time it is issued, although a
literal reading of the section may lead to the result that the time it is
drawn and signed is critical. There is no reason, however, for requiring that the instrument be payable in money until it is issued and
thus passed into the commercial world. In fact, the better rule would
appear to require only that the instrument be payable in money (as
defined by Section 1-201(24)) at the time one claiming under it
purchased it, but this seems clearly contrary to the wording of Sec159. "That definition rejects the narrow view of some early cases that 'money' is limited
to legal tender. Legal tender acts do no more than designate a particular kind of money
which the obligee will be required to accept in discharge of an obligation. It rejects also the
contention sometimes advanced that 'money' includes any medium of exchange accepted in
a particular community, whether it be gold dust, beaver pelts, or cigarettes in occupied
Germany." Official Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 3-107.
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tion 3-107. Thus, if an instrument were drawn and issued payable in
a medium not recognized by a government as money, it would remain nonnegotiable even though the medium were subsequently
recognized. No one, not even a taker after the recognition had been
given, could become a holder in due course.
It is immaterial what government affords recognition. Thus, an
instrument payable in French francs would be negotiable even
though it was drawn in the United States, circulated only locally, and
payable in this country. Or, as Section 3-107 states: "A promise or
order to pay a sum stated in foreign currency is for a sum certain ......
Where an instrument is stated in foreign currency, it may be paid
either in the foreign currency or in dollars unless the instrument
specifies the foreign currency as the medium of payment. Since there
is a presumption that either dollars or the foreign currency may be
tendered in payment, a clear indication that only the foreign currency is acceptable must appear on the instrument. Probably,
nothing less than a legend such as "This note is payable only in
German marks" would suffice. The number of dollars that must be
tendered is based upon the number of dollars that could be purchased by the stated foreign currency at the time, and presumably at
the place, where the instrument is payable. If the instrument is payable on demand, then the date demand is made controls. If the
parties desire to establish a different rule for computing exchange,
this would be permissible and should not affect the negotiability of
the instrument.
New York has omitted the last sentence of Section 3-107(2),
thereby apparently making it impossible to require that instruments
be payable only in a foreign currency. The amendment has been
criticized by the Permanent Editorial Board as being restrictive of
international trade practices.' 60
160. California initially deleted the same sentence as New York but restored the language. The response of the Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. to the New York
omission is instructive:
The variation in this subsection and the reasons advanced for it evidence
possible misconceptions as to the purpose of the subsection and its potential
effect.
Part 1 of Article 3, in which § 3-107 appears, deals with form an interpretation of negotiable instruments. Subsection (2) of § 3-107 states affirmatively that a promise or order to pay a sum stated in a foreign currency is for a
sum certain in money and, therefore, does not destroy negotiability. The
subsection then goes on to state a presumption that such an obligation may be
satisfied by payment in dollars in an amount determined by the buying sight
rate of the foreign currency on the day the instrument becomes payable.
However, New York and California object to and have deleted the additional
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Where an instrument payable only in a foreign currency is dishonored, an American court will give judgment in dollars. In so
doing, they should compute the amount by the buying sight rate of
the foreign currency at the time and place that payment was due.
Instruments payable in goods-or something other than moneyare not negotiable within Article 3, but Official Comment 1 to Section 3-107 strongly indicates that this is not meant to restrict courts,
or the legislatures, from giving the attributes of negotiability to such
instruments.' 6 1 Thus, even in spite of the issuer's attempt to restrict
their alienability, trading stamps may be given some of the attributes
of negotiability: e.g., that a good faith purchaser from a thief has
right as against the issuing company and the "true" owner. Merchandise certificates are in a similar situation as are "free" coupons
distributed with some products.
provision that if the instrument specifies a foreign currency as the medium of
payment, the instrument is payable in that currency.
The subsection does not say that every promise or order to pay a sum stated
in a foreign currency must be paid in the foreign currency. The general presumption is the other way, namely, that it may be satisfied by payment in
dollars at a designated exchange rate. It is only if an instrument specifies a
foreign currency as the medium of payment that it then becomes so payable.
To come within this special rule, presumably an instrument would have to
include a special phrase such as 'This instrument is payable only in French
francs' or some equivalent language.
With the steady increase in international transactions there may be good
reason for a drawer of a draft or a maker of a note to specify a particular
foreign currency in which payment is to be made. If this is done, there is good
reason for a rule of law stating that payment should be made as specifically so
prescribed. If such an order is directed to a bank, this will not impose a duty
on the bank to pay in the foreign currency unless the drawer has an account
with the bank in that currency or has made arrangements with the bank to
have such currency available. As specifically provided in subsection (1) of
§ 3-409, a check or draft does not of itself operate as an assignment and the
drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it. This carries forward
the longstanding rule of N.I.L. § 127. Under these rules (absent an acceptance) the drawee's only duty runs to the drawer and if the drawer has not
provided the foreign currency to meet the check or draft, the drawee may
dishonor in the same way it may dishonor a dollar check or draft where the
drawer has no account or there are insufficient funds in the drawer's account
to meet the check or draft.
The fact that Federal and state courts in the United States will grant judgments only in terms of United States dollars is beside the point. American
courts will not grant judgments in terms of wheat, aluminum or other property but parties repeatedly obligate themselves to deliver wheat, aluminum and
many other kinds of property. American courts render judgments in United
States dollars for failure to deliver wheat or aluminum, and, similarly, can
render judgments in United States dollars (in appropriate cases against appropriate parties) for failure to pay an instrument in a foreign currency.
The Editorial Board does not believe the criticisms are sound and sees no good
reason to amend this subsection.
161. See § IVsupra.
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The Code does not deal directly with instruments that promise to
pay money'or to perform some other act. Section 3-104(l)(b) requires a promise or order to pay money "and no other promise,
order, obligation, or power given by the maker or drawer except as
authorized by this Article." Since this is in the conjunctive, it can be
interpreted to prohibit only other promises, orders, obligations, and
powers that are given in addition to a promise to pay money. This
interpretation would tend to preserve the pre-Code rule that held
negotiability unaffected by an option given the holder to demand
either money or some other act.1 62 Although this construction is
reasonable, it is not in keeping with the apparent legislative policy of
Article 3 and should be rejected.
The contrary interpretation-that an option given to the holder
destroys negotiability -is just as tenable from a reading of the Code
language and more in keeping with the overall policy of the Code.
The decision has been made by the legislature that Article 3 is to
govern only that portion of transferable rights that normally circulate as a substitute for money. Instruments giving the holder an
option to take money or something else may be useful in some
special circumstance but they are not of that ilk. If they are to be
given some, or all, or the attributes of negotiability, this should be
done by case-law development outside the Code. Analogies to Code
rules should be drawn, but the instrument should be treated as sui
generis. The omission of any provision comparable to Subsection
5(4)' 61 'of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law strongly supports the suggested interpretation as does the Official Comment to
Section 3-112. 164

162. See, e.g., Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661, 1 A.L.R. 714 (1918);
Sandlin v. Maury Nat'l Bank, 210 Ala 349, 98 So. 190 (1923); People's Bank v. Porter, 58
Cal. App. 41, 208 P. 200 (1922).
163. Section 5(4) of the U.N.I.L. read: " .. But the negotiable character of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision which... (4) Gives the holder an
election to require something to be done in lieu of payment of money."
164. "Subsection (4) of the original § 5 [quoted in n. 163 supra] is omitted because it
has been important only in connection with bonds and other investment securities now
covered by Article 8 of this Act. An option to require something to be done in lieu of
payment of money is uncommon and not desirable in commercial paper." Official Comment
(Purpose of Changes and New Matter) to U.C.C. § 3-112.

